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ABSTRACT
This Article is an empirical study of what we call 
citation stickiness. A citation is sticky if it appears in 
one of the parties’ briefs and then again in the court’s 
opinion. Imagine that the parties use their briefs to toss 
citations in the court’s direction. Some of those 
citations stick and appear in the opinion—these are the 
sticky citations. Some of those citations don’t stick 
and go unmentioned by the court—these are the 
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unsticky ones. Finally, some sources were never 
mentioned by the parties yet appear in the court’s 
opinion. These authorities are endogenous—they 
spring from the court itself. 
In a perfect adversarial world, the percentage of sticky 
citations in courts’ opinions would be something 
approaching 100%. The parties would discuss the 
relevant authorities in their briefs, and the court would 
rely on the same authorities in its decisionmaking. 
Spoiler alert: our adversarial world is imperfect. 
Endogenous citations abound in judicial opinions and 
parties’ briefs are brimming with unsticky citations. 
So we crunched the numbers. We analyzed 325 cases 
decided by the federal courts of appeals. Of the 7552 
cited cases in those opinions, more than half were 
never mentioned in the parties’ briefs. But there’s 
more—in the article, you’ll learn how many of the 
23,479 cited cases in the parties’ briefs were sticky 
and how many were unsticky. You’ll see the stickiness 
data sliced and diced in numerous ways: by circuit, by 
case topic, by an assortment of characteristics of the 
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This article is an empirical study of what we call citation 
stickiness. A citation is sticky if it appears in one of the parties’ 
briefs and then again in the court’s opinion. If it helps, picture 
the parties tossing citations in the court’s direction. Some of 
those citations stick and some of them don’t. The ones that don’t 
stick—that don’t appear in the court’s opinion—are unsticky. 
That covers the citations in the parties’ briefs—they are either 
sticky or unsticky. As for the citations in a court’s opinion, they 
are either sticky—meaning that the same source was cited in at 
least one brief—or they are endogenous—meaning that they 
appeared for the first time in the opinion. Endogenous citations 
spring from the court itself. 
Consider a recent Tenth Circuit opinion in which the court 
cited thirty-three distinct cases.1 Thirty-one of those cases were 
not mentioned in any of the parties’ briefs. The opening brief 
cited twenty-nine cases,2 the response brief cited eighteen,3 and 
the reply brief cited five.4 Out of all of the cases cited by the 
parties, however, the Tenth Circuit cited one from the opening 
brief, one from the response brief, and thirty-one that were not 
mentioned in any brief. On the other end of the spectrum, 
consider a recent opinion from the Seventh Circuit.5 The court’s 
opinion contains eleven unique case citations. Every single one 
of those eleven cases had been cited in one or more of the 
parties’ briefs.6
1. Garling v. U.S. EPA, 849 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2017). 
2. Corrected Brief of Petitioners, Garling v. U.S. EPA, 849 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 16-8028), 2016 WL 4010431, at ii–iii. 
3. Brief of Appellee, Garling v. U.S. EPA, 849 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-
8028), 2016 WL 5899579, at ii–iii. 
4. Reply Brief of Petitioners, Garling v. U.S. EPA, 849 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 
16-8028), 2016 WL 6247387, at ii. To be clear, there weren’t fifty-two distinct cases cited 
in the three briefs. Some cases were cited in more than one brief (for example, a case cited 
in both the opening and response briefs). 
5. Geiger v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 845 F.3d 357 (7th Cir. 2017). 
6. In Geiger, the Westlaw-generated tables of authorities reported that the opening brief 
cited thirty-six cases, the response brief cited sixty cases, and the reply brief cited thirteen 
cases. See the tables of authorities tabs associated to the following documents: Brief for 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 2016 WL 4254468, Brief of Defendant-Appellee, 2016 WL 5369221, 
and Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, 2016 WL 5461992. Our method for determining 
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For the Tenth Circuit case, we’d say that the cited cases in 
the opinion were 6% sticky and 94% endogenous.7 We’d say 
that the cited cases in the opening brief were about 3% sticky 
and 97% unsticky.8 For the Seventh Circuit case, the opinion 
contained 100% sticky case citations.9 None of the cases cited in 
the opinion were endogenous.10
From those numbers alone, we cannot tell you whether the 
briefs in the Tenth Circuit case are better or worse than the 
briefs in the Seventh Circuit case. We cannot tell you whether 
the Tenth Circuit’s decision is better or worse than the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision. But what we can tell you is that there is wide 
variation in the percentage of cited cases in judicial opinions that 
originated in the parties’ briefs.11 The other thing we can tell you 
is that parties cite a lot of cases in their briefs that are never 
discussed in the resulting judicial opinions. Maybe you had 
some general sense of this already. Maybe not. But we bet you 
don’t know the numbers. We do. 
We traced the provenance of 7552 cited cases in 325 
federal appellate opinions. We know how many of those case 
citations were borrowed from the parties’ briefs and how many 
came from within the court itself. Read on to learn specifics, but 
here’s a spoiler: most of the cases cited in the federal appellate 
opinions that we studied were not cited in either of the parties’ 
briefs. 
This result surprised us, as it surprised the participants in 
our online and conference-audience polls.12 This finding is 
novel, as most citation-practice studies of judicial opinions do 
not trace the origins of the cited authorities. Studies that have 
tracked the communication of citations from the briefs to the 
resulting opinions have used smaller sample sizes and have been 
limited to only a few courts. 
7. Two out of thirty-three is 6.06%.
8. One out of twenty-nine is 3.45%. 
9. Eleven out of eleven is 100%. 
10. Of the cases cited in that appeal’s opening brief, about 17% were sticky and 83% 
were unsticky. (Six of the 36 cases from the opening brief were later cited in the Geiger
opinion. Six out of 36 is 16.67%.) 
11. Using our terminology, we’d say there is wide variation in the percentage of case 
citations in judicial opinions that are sticky and endogenous. 
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Additionally, we tracked the journeys of the 23,479 cases 
that the parties deemed worthy of citing in their briefs. We know 
how many of those cited cases later showed up in the resulting 
judicial opinions and how many did not. 
Are there some characteristics that correlate with increased 
or decreased citation stickiness? Do some circuits tend to 
produce opinions with higher citation stickiness than others? Do 
some types of cases tend to result in higher citation stickiness? 
Do some judicial characteristics tend to correlate with higher 
citation stickiness? Fear not—we have sliced and diced the data 
in numerous ways. 
And what does it all mean? That is a little less clear. Is it a 
problem that most of the cases cited in the opinions weren’t 
mentioned by the parties? Yes, we’d say that these results 
indicate that something is amiss in our adversarial system. But 
where to point the finger? At attorneys for submitting shoddy 
briefs? At courts for disregarding the papers filed by the parties? 
Don’t worry, dear reader, we devote an entire section to 
hypothesizing. 
What follows are the results of our empirical study of 
citation stickiness in the federal courts of appeals. In Part I, we 
review the existing literature on citation studies and explain why 
studying citation stickiness is a worthwhile endeavor. In Part II, 
we lay out our research methodology. Part III reports our results, 
analyzing stickiness by various dimensions, such as case topic 
and certain characteristics of the authoring judges. Finally, Part 
IV hypothesizes what it all may mean and identifies some 
additional avenues for future research. 
I. WHY [READ A] STUDY [ABOUT] CITATION STICKINESS?
So why should we study citation stickiness? Or, more 
saliently at this point, why should you read our study about 
citation stickiness? Most critically, our study is novel. It fills a 
heretofore unfilled gap. While filling a gap may be a necessary 
reason to undertake a study, it is not itself a sufficient one. There 
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they are not worth studying.13 Aside from its novelty, citation 
stickiness is worth studying because it provides a window into 
judicial decisionmaking. Judges often lament the quality of 
attorneys’ briefs. Attorneys often lament the quality of judges’ 
decisions, especially when the opinions explaining those 
decisions veer away from the issues set forth in the briefs. 
Measuring citation stickiness will help uncover to what extent 
judges are conducting independent legal research. Answering 
that question seems foundational to determining whether judges 
are doing too much research, too little, or just the right amount. 
This Part will proceed with a summary of the citation 
studies to date and identify the precise gap that our study fills. It 
will then discuss the utility of studying citation stickiness. 
A. Review of the Citation-Study Literature 
While it would be nice to say that we were experts on the 
citation-study literature before this project began, that would not 
be the whole truth.14 We had not read every citation study out 
there and thoughtfully noticed a gap in the citation stickiness 
department. Rather, as many researchers do, we started with the 
question and discovered the gap. We thought citation stickiness 
was interesting, but when we researched it, we found little data 
that answered the question of whether courts generally stick to 
the legal authorities cited by the parties. 
To be sure, there are plenty of citation-practice studies out 
there.15 Many answer quite interesting questions. Given the 
laborious nature of the research, however, many of the studies 
are quite limited in scope. Many have small datasets or focus on 
13. And there are a few things that have been studied even though they weren’t worth 
studying. 
14. And, yes, that is even the case for the one of us who previously authored an 
empirical citation study. See Kevin Bennardo, Testing the Geographical Proximity 
Hypothesis: An Empirical Study of Citations to Nonbinding Precedents by Indiana 
Appellate Courts, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 125 (2015). 
15. For example, one article, which is itself more than a decade old, cites over fifty 
previous citation studies as background. Dietrich Fausten, Ingrid Nielsen & Russell Smyth, 
A Century of Citation Practice on the Supreme Court of Victoria, 31 MELB. U. L. REV.
733, 735–36 nn.12–20 (2007). We won’t do the same here—but surely there are plenty of 
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a particular year or narrow band of years.16 Many are limited to 
studying the courts of a particular state or territory.17 On the 
federal side, these citation studies disproportionately focus on 
the United States Supreme Court.18 Despite the quantity of 
existing citation studies, there have been numerous calls for 
expansion of this method of research.19
Citation studies have largely focused exclusively on courts’ 
opinions and ignored citation provenance. Studies have analyzed 
whether courts cite the same scholarship that academics do20 and 
16. Id. at 736 (“Because of the financial cost of collecting large datasets, most studies 
have focused on citation practice within a single year or a few select years.”). 
17. E.g., A. Michael Beaird, Citations to Authority by the Arkansas Appellate Courts, 
1950–2000, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 301 (2003); William H. Manz, The Citation 
Practices of the New York Court of Appeals: A Millennium Update, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1273 
(2001); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas 
Court of Appeals, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 120 (1998); Fritz Snyder, The Citation 
Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); James Leonard, 
An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 
LAW LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A 
Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39 (1979); John Henry Merryman, Toward 
a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California 
Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977). 
18. E.g., Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, The Citation and Depreciation of U.S. 
Supreme Court Precedent, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325 (2013); Raizel Liebler & 
June Liebert, Something Rotten in the State of Legal Citation: The Life Span of a United 
States Supreme Court Citation Containing an Internet Link (1996–2010), 15 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 273 (2013); Frank B. Cross, James F. Spriggs II, Timothy R. Johnson & Paul J. 
Wahlbeck, Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use and 
Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489; Jules Gleicher, The Bard at the Bar: Some 
Citations of Shakespeare by the United States Supreme Court, 26 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV.
327 (2001). 
19. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Chief Justice Roberts and Precedent: A Preliminary 
Study, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1251, 1277–78 (2008); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
the Use of Citations in the Law, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 381, 381–83 (2000). 
20. See Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and 
Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles? 71 CHI-KENT L. REV. 871 (1996). 
Academics tend to pay a disproportionate amount of attention to citations to legal 
scholarship relative to other types of authorities. See, e.g., Derek Simpson & Lee 
Petherbridge, An Empirical Study of the Use of Legal Scholarship in Supreme Court 
Trademark Jurisprudence, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 931 (2014); Brent E. Newton, Law 
Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the Twenty-First-Century Supreme Court Justices: An 
Empirical Analysis, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 399 (2012); David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, 
The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 1345 (2011); Lou J. Sirico, Jr., The Citing of Law Reviews by the 
Supreme Court: 1971–1999, 75 IND. L.J. 1009 (2000); Vaughan Black & Nicholas Richter, 
Did She Mention My Name?: Citation of Academic Authority by the Supreme Court of 
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how precedents are transmitted from court to court.21 But few 
have compared the sources cited in the parties’ briefs to the 
sources cited in the resulting opinions, perhaps because this is a 
question that is likely more interesting to practitioners than to 
academics.22 With a notable exception or two, the studies that 
have previously compared briefs’ citations to opinions’ citations 
have been extremely limited in scope.23 The existing studies are 
summarized below. 
1. Study of Citation Stickiness in the State Courts 
The most robust citation stickiness study to date is Thomas 
Marvell’s state-court study from over forty years ago. The court, 
however, was anonymous. All we know is that it was the 
“supreme court of a northern industrial state,” referred to by Dr. 
Marvell as the “focal court” of his study.24 The Marvell dataset 
comprised 112 cases argued during a one-year period ending in 
June 1972.25 Comparing the attorneys’ submissions to the 
opinions, Dr. Marvell found that “[a] little less than half the 
legal authorities cited in the majority and minority opinions in 
the 112 focal cases studied here were mentioned in the parties’ 
briefs or oral arguments, and but one-sixth of the authorities 
21. E.g., Iain Carmichael, James Wudel, Michael Kim & James Jushchuk, Comment, 
Examining the Evolution of Legal Precedent through Citation Network Analysis, 96 N.C. 
L. REV. 227 (2017); Bennardo, supra note 14; Russell Smyth & Vinod Mishra, The
Transmission of Legal Precedent Across the Australian State Supreme Courts over the 
Twentieth Century, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 139 (2011). 
22. See Cross, supra note 19, at 1272 (heralding briefs as “a heretofore underutilized 
tool of empirical research”). Even some studies that have included data regarding the 
sources cited in the parties’ briefs and the resulting opinions have failed to compare the two 
datasets to determine the extent to which the parties’ citations influence the court’s 
citations. See, e.g., Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 1018, 1025 tbl.2, 1030 tbl.4 (1996). Other studies have compared the language used in 
briefs and opinions, but specifically excluded the citation from comparison. See, e.g.,
Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Influence of Parties’ 
Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 468, 471 (2008) (noting methodology of skipping citations in a 
study using plagiarism software to compare language in briefs and opinions). 
23. This statement isn’t meant to be critical. Most of these studies were primarily 
studying other things. 
24. THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION 
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mentioned by the attorneys were cited in the opinions.”26 As a 
sort of control study, Dr. Marvell also compared the citations in 
the published opinions and briefs of thirty civil cases from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.27 His 
results were fairly consistent with the focal court study: 55% of 
the authorities cited by the Sixth Circuit in those cases were first 
mentioned in the briefs.28
Combining his data with interviews with judges and court 
staff, Dr. Marvell concluded that courts generally do a lot of 
independent legal research, although the exact amount seemed 
to vary quite a bit from chambers to chambers.29 He noted that 
several of the focal court justices’ law clerks “said that they used 
the briefs hardly at all or only as a place to begin the research 
when writing draft opinions or memorandums. The law clerks 
or, increasingly, the staff attorneys do the great bulk of the 
research.”30
The other existing citation-stickiness study of a state court 
focused on the citation of New Jersey cases in the appellate 
courts of New Jersey. In an effort to bring attention to the 
deficiencies of the state bar, the Chief Justice of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court asked the sergeants-at-arms of the state supreme 
court and the appellate division “to go through our opinions and 
the briefs on every appeal that has been decided over the past 
year and to note the New Jersey decisions in the opinions that 
are not cited in the briefs.”31 Unfortunately, the Chief Justice did 
not report the data in a way that would allow us to calculate the 
actual stickiness rate. Instead, he highlighted the fact that 82% 
of the opinions of the state supreme court and 41% of the 
opinions of the intermediate appellate court cited to at least one 
New Jersey case that was not mentioned in the briefs. In the 
26. Id. at 132 (endnote omitted). Oral argument did not add much in the way of new 
authorities—Dr. Marvell found that only 1% of the parties’ authorities were mentioned at 
oral argument and not in briefs. Id. at 133. We note here that Dr. Marvell served up the 
data several different ways, see, e.g., id. at 132–36, and we recommend reading his study in 
full. 
27. Id. at 134–36, 135 n.18. 
28. Id.at 134–35. 
29. Id. at 135–36. 
30. Id. at 135. 
31. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Our New Judicial Establishment: The Record of the First 





      12/10/2019   14:38:26
41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 40 Side A      12/10/2019   14:38:26
CITATION STICKINESS 71
Chief Justice’s view, this was enough to show “how deficient a 
large portion of the briefs filed in our appellate courts are in 
point of law and what a burden of independent research they 
impose on the judges.”32
2. Study of Citation Stickiness in the Federal Courts 
Aside from the Marvell study mentioned in the last 
subsection, the next most sizable study of citation stickiness to 
date was William Manz’s study of the Supreme Court. Mr. 
Manz compared the decisional authorities cited in the briefs to 
those cited in the Supreme Court’s eighty majority opinions 
during its 1996 term.33 On the issue of citation stickiness, he 
found that 74.5% of the decisional authorities cited in the 
Court’s opinions were also cited in one or more of the briefs.34
Mr. Manz thus surmised that “roughly one-quarter of the Court’s 
case citations resulted from its own research.”35 Relatively few 
of the cases from the briefs were later cited by the majority 
opinion—only about 25%.36
In a self-described “brief” study, Professor Cross assessed 
Chief Justice Roberts’s approach to precedent by examining the 
opinions that the Chief Justice authored in his first term.37 As 
part of the examination, Professor Cross looked at how often 
Chief Justice Roberts cited the same cases that had been cited in 
the parties’ briefs.38 The sample size was small: only nine 
32. Id.
33. William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative 
Study, 94 L. LIBR. J. 267, 267–68 (2002). The Manz study included citations to judicial 
opinions and administrative decisions, but excluded citations to constitutions, statutes, and 
regulations. Id. at 268. 
34. Id. at 271 tbl.5 (reporting that, of the 1915 authorities cited in the Court’s opinions, 
1427 were first cited in a brief). Of the 1915 citations in the Court’s opinions, 146 (or 
7.6%) appeared first in an amicus brief and not in any of the parties’ briefs. Id. at 272 
tbl.7. 
35. Id. at 271. 
36. See id. at 271, 272 tbl.6. The Manz study includes a number of other worthwhile 
data points, including citation-stickiness data for numerous types of secondary authorities, 
and we commend it to you in full. 
37. Cross, supra note 19, at 1251. All the cases were published in 2005 and 2006. See
id. at 1274 nn.146–54.
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cases.39 In the briefs for the nine cases, he found that 168 cases 
had been cited by both parties.40 Professor Cross also noted that 
“[o]ne might think that if both parties relied on the case, it 
would be an unavoidable citation for the Court’s opinion.”41
That did not turn out to be so. Of the 168 cases cited by both 
parties, only seventy-eight of them (a little over 46%) appeared 
in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinions.42 By aggregating some of 
the data reported in the Cross study, it appears that the nine 
Roberts opinions cited a total of 305 cases,43 of which 124 (over 
40%) were not mentioned in either party’s briefs. Professor 
Cross concludes that “[i]t seems plain that Justice Roberts 
exercised considerable discretion in choosing which precedents 
to cite.”44
While much narrower in scope than the Manz study, 
Professor Cross’s observations from Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinions demonstrate a much lower rate of citation stickiness 
than did Manz’s study of the broader court. Other researchers 
have attempted to measure the stickiness of specific types of 
authorities at the Supreme Court, including its citations to legal 
periodicals,45 its rate of “interpretation” of legal authorities,46
39. Id. at 1274 tbl.3 (“Opinion Citations Compared with Briefs”).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1273.
42. Id. at 1274 tbl.3. 
43. We arrived at this number by summing the middle four columns of Table 3 in the 
Cross article. See id. This result is at odds, however, with Professor Cross’s earlier claim 
that Chief Justice Roberts cited an average of twenty-seven cases per opinion, id. at 1268, 
which would result in the citation of only 243 cases in nine opinions. In any event, Chief 
Justice Roberts got a substantial proportion of his cited cases from somewhere other than 
the parties’ briefs. 
44. Id. at 1274. 
45. Professor Newland’s study focused on the citation of legal periodicals by individual 
Supreme Court Justices from 1924 through 1956. Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals 
and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 477 (1959). In one portion 
of his study, he identified the thirteen Justices who most frequently cited legal periodicals. 
Id. at 480 tbl.3 (“Totals of Articles Cited by 13 Justices Who Have Most Frequently Cited 
Legal Periodicals”). Although Professor Newland himself did not total the data, the upshot 
is that of the 1453 articles cited by the Justices, only 262 of them had appeared in the briefs 
(approximately 18%). In majority opinions, the percentage of articles cited in the opinion 
that had appeared in the briefs was a little over 20% (199 of 958). In concurring opinions, 
the percentage was highest at a little over 23% (22 of 94). And for dissenting opinions, the 
percentage was lowest at only a little over 10% of the cited articles coming from the briefs 
(41 of 401). Professor Newland did not draw many conclusions from this data, but did note 
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and its use of legislative history.47 Because the Supreme Court is 
a judicial body that is uniquely not bound by the traditional 
Brandeis’s well-known practice of completing considerable original research in preparation 
of his opinions.” Id. at 480. The Newland study shows that Justice Brandeis cited 127 
articles, only five of which appeared in the briefs. Id. at 480 tbl.3. 
46. Professors Spriggs and Hansford studied how the Supreme Court “chose to legally 
interpret the set of available Supreme Court precedents” in the 1991 and 1995 terms. James 
F. Spriggs II & Thomas G. Hansford, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Incorporation and 
Interpretation of Precedent, 36 L. & SOC’Y REV. 139, 139 (2002). Importantly, the authors 
focused on which precedents the Court elected to “interpret,” not on the Court’s mere 
citation of precedents. Id. at 146. The authors noted that the Court may deal with a 
precedent in “three basic ways”: positively interpret it (by relying on it), negatively 
interpret it (by distinguishing, limiting, or overruling it), or not legally interpret it. Id. at 
141. To identify the world of precedents that the Court could potentially interpret, the 
authors “assumed that the available set of precedents in a case consisted of the Supreme 
Court cases referred to in its briefs.” Id. at 145. The authors noted all of the Supreme Court 
cases that the parties had cited in their briefs and found that there were approximately sixty 
potential “precedents” that the Court could interpret in each case. Id. Thus, the authors’ 
focus was not comparing the cases cited in the parties’ briefs to the cases cited in the 
Court’s opinions; rather, their focus was comparing the cases cited in the parties’ briefs to 
the cases actually “interpreted” in the Court’s opinions. The authors relied on Shepard’s 
Citations to determine whether a cited case was actually “interpreted” by the Court. Id. at 
146. 
The results were quite low: the Court “interpreted” only 2.3% of the cases cited in 
the parties’ briefs. Id. at 149–50 (reporting that the Court interpreted 250 out of 10,842 
possible precedents). The authors opined that this result may be the product of attorneys’ 
adopting a “scattershot” approach of citing many precedents in their briefs, “many of 
which are not particularly relevant to the case at hand.” Id. at 150 n.16. Stripping out the 
irrelevant precedents, the authors found that the Court “interpreted” a little over 15% of the 
legally relevant precedents. Id. at 151. One of the more interesting (to us) tidbits was 
relegated to a footnote: the Court analyzed twenty-six precedents that were absent from the 
parties’ briefs, meaning that something like 10% of the cases that the Court “interpreted” 
were not even mentioned by the parties. Id. at 145 n.4.  
The authors later updated the study using a revised methodology. See THOMAS G.
HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT 93–108 (2006). In the revised study, the authors conceded that their earlier 
approach of defining the world of potential precedent as only the authorities cited in the 
parties’ briefs was “underinclusive,” as evidenced by the fact “that such a research design 
misses approximately 10% of all cases actually interpreted by the Court.” Id. at 95–96. In 
the revised study, the authors defined the world of potential precedent much more 
expansively: as all of the cases orally argued at the Supreme Court since 1946. Id. at 96. 
47. Professor Parrillo examined the use of legislative history as a tool of statutory 
interpretation in judicial decisions. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive 
Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 
1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266 (2013). Specifically, he sought to track the path by which 
legislative history went from being a permissible tool of statutory interpretation to a 
“normal, routine, and expected” one. Id. at 274. Using statutory-interpretation cases 
decided by the Supreme Court from 1940 to 1945, he compared citations to legislative 
history in the briefs to those in the resulting opinions. Id. at 281. Although Professor 
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system of precedents, studying it provides a skewed perspective 
into judicial decisionmaking writ large. 
In another notable study that touched on citation stickiness, 
a trio of researchers investigated the effectiveness of using 
automated content analysis as a research methodology in legal 
scholarship.48 Although they were “focused primarily on 
validating [their] methodology, rather than on the results it 
generates,” they noted that they managed to “generate[] 
intriguing results that suggest avenues for further study.”49 In 
other words, the citation-stickiness data was but a happy 
collateral byproduct of the actual focus of the study. 
One area at which the trio aimed their automated content 
analysis was a citation study of First Circuit opinions.50 As a 
way to measure “judicial responsiveness,” the researchers 
“assessed the relationship between the briefs and the opinions in 
terms of authorities upon which both relied.”51 The researchers 
stated that “a court’s resort to the same authorities as relied upon 
by the parties seems almost necessarily to be coextensive with a 
responsive analysis.”52 With a sample size of thirty First Circuit 
opinions, the authors found that only 35% of the authorities 
cited by the court were cited in either party’s brief.53
Conversely, only about 16% of the authorities cited in the 
Court received in briefs filed by the federal government, id. at 281–82, he uncovered some 
data regarding citation stickiness in this slender area. In the cases involving briefs from the 
federal government, his research showed that 
22% of the citations [to legislative history in the Court’s opinions] matched both 
the federal brief and at least one non-federal brief (such as the brief of a private 
party or state government); 33% of the citations matched the federal brief and no 
other brief; 10% of the citations matched at least non-federal brief but not the 
federal brief; and 24% of the citations matched no brief (suggesting they arose 
from the Court’s own research). 
Id. at 317. In cases with no federal-government briefs, Professor Parrillo found that “45% 
of the citations to legislative history appeared in at least one of the briefs, while 55% did 
not (suggesting they came from the Court’s own research).” Id. at 318. Parrillo then 
hypothesized about the factors that gave rise to the Court’s ability to conduct so much 
internal research into legislative history. Id. at 361–64. 
48. Chad M. Oldfather, Joseph P. Bockhorst & Brian P. Dimmer, Triangulating 
Judicial Responsiveness: Automated Content Analysis, Judicial Opinions, and the 
Methodology of Legal Scholarship, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (2012). 
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1232–39. 
51. Id. at 1232. 
52. Id. at 1234. 
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parties’ briefs were cited by the court.54 Although the 
researchers were focused on methodology rather than results, 
they found the citation-analysis results “intriguing in their own 
right” and suggested further study.55 Similar to Professor 
Cross’s observation that Chief Justice Roberts did not confine 
himself to the sources cited in the parties’ briefs, these 
researchers observed that “judges have, and exercise, a 
considerable amount of discretion in choosing which precedent 
to follow.”56
B. The Utility of Studying Citation Stickiness 
As chronicled above, previous comparison studies of 
citations in briefs and resulting opinions are spotty, scattered, 
and often aged. They are limited in scope. Some deal only with 
citations to authorities other than cases.57 Many focus on the 
United States Supreme Court.58 Most have very small sample 
sizes. Thus, there is a gap in the literature. But is it a gap worth 
filling? 
We think it is. More accurately, we thought it was. And 
then we partially filled it with this article. Now we’ll attempt to 
convince you that we spent our efforts wisely. 
First, there is the incomplete, but interesting, story told by 
the data reported above. Although the previous citation 
stickiness studies are spotty and limited, there is one common 
thread: they consistently indicate that a substantial proportion of 
the authorities cited in courts’ opinions were not cited in the 
parties’ briefs. A larger and more comprehensive study was 
needed to validate those findings. 
Second, data on judicial decisionmaking aids brief writers. 
There have been an increasing number of calls for more 
empirical research into judicial decisionmaking. Although there 
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1238–39 (noting it was “striking how little overlap there is between the 
parties’ citations and the court’s”). 
56. Id. at 1239. Additionally, the Marvell state-court study contains a limited citation-
stickiness analysis of Sixth Circuit opinions from the 1970s. See supra Section I.A.1. 
57. See Newland, supra note 45; Parrillo, supra note 47.
58. See, e.g., Newland, supra note 45; HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 46; Spriggs 
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is much conventional wisdom (some of which conflicts with 
other conventional wisdom), there is relatively little evidence on 
what affects judicial decisionmaking.59 For example, there is a 
foundational perception that the parties’ briefs are important, but 
we don’t actually know to what extent that is true, nor do we 
have a good sense of what makes some briefs more persuasive 
than others.60 Identifying the factors that increase judicial 
responsiveness can help attorneys write briefs that are more 
likely to prompt relevant discussion by the court.61
Third, data on citation stickiness can help shape debates 
over the process of resolving disputes in our judicial system.62
On the one hand, some judges have vocally expressed a belief 
that attorneys’ briefs are largely deficient and generally 
unhelpful.63 They complain that attorneys do not write well and, 
worse, fail to discuss the controlling precedents.64 On the other 
hand, some attorneys and commentators have decried 
shortcomings in the quality of judicial decisions, and 
particularly have complained about judicial attempts at 
decisionmaking without the benefit of the parties’ input.65 The 
most robust literature debates to what extent judges may or 
59. See, e.g., Ted Becker, What We Still Don’t Know About What Persuades Judges—
And Some Ways We Might Find Out, 22 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 41, 41–43 (2018). 
60. Attempts at empirically assessing the effect of briefs have increased in recent years. 
See, e.g., Shaun B. Spencer & Adam Feldman, Words Count: The Empirical Relationship 
Between Brief Writing and Summary Judgment Success, 22 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 61
(2018); Adam Feldman, A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court Opinion Language, 1946–
2013, 86 MISS. L.J. 105 (2017); Adam Feldman, Counting on Quality: The Effects of 
Merits Brief Quality on Supreme Court Decisions, 94 DENV. L. REV. 43 (2016). 
61. See Oldfather et. al, supra note 48, at 1218–19 (“One could imagine, for example, 
large-scale analysis of the relationships among briefs and opinions generating information 
about the relative utility of briefing practices and approaches.”).
62. See id. at 1217–18.
63. See, e.g., Vanderbilt, supra note 31, at 361 (“[F]our out of five of all the briefs 
submitted to us are of inferior quality.”); Stephen L. Wasby, As Seen From Behind the 
Bench: Judges’ Commentary on Lawyers’ Competence, 38 J. LEGAL PROF. 47, 61–68 
(2013) (reporting judges’ negative reactions to briefs). 
64. See, e.g., Vanderbilt, supra note 31, at 361; Wasby, supra note 63, at 61–62 
(recounting judicial reaction to the omission of a key case from the briefing). 
65. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 972 (2009) (“Other times, the court will resolve 
the case by employing legal reasoning and citing legal authorities not suggested by the 
parties—which means that the parties were never able to challenge or criticize the legal 
reasoning that drove the court’s decision. . . . This can lead to mistakes that the parties 
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should engage in independent factual research outside of the 
record.66 But some commentators are equally critical of sua 
sponte rulings on issues not briefed by the parties, and of courts 
basing their decisions on precedents that the parties did not 
brief.67 If judges are restricted from independently researching 
facts, should they be similarly restricted from independently 
researching law? If not, why not?68
In short, judges are skeptical of attorneys’ ability to be 
helpful, but attorneys are equally skeptical of judges’ ability to 
make sound decisions without their help. Trust is lacking on 
both sides. This article won’t resolve this issue. Instead, its 
contribution is data. This article will tell you what proportion of 
66. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits independent judicial research of 
“facts.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010); see also
ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 478 (2017); CHARLES 
GARDNER GEYH ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 5.04, 5-24 (5th ed. 2013) 
(“Independent factual investigation impairs the function of an adversarial system by 
allowing a judge to craft decisions on the basis of facts that may be unknown to one or both 
of the parties and therefore indisputable by them regardless of their accuracy or relevance.” 
(footnote omitted)). Of course, that leaves open to debate what is “fact” and what is not. 
See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV.
1255, 1264–71 (2012); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical 
Limits on Independent Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131, 148–57 (2008); David L. Faigman, 
Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding: Exploring the Empirical Component of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 551–56 (1991); Laurens Walker & 
John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV.
877, 880–82 (1988); Peggy C. Davis, “There is a Book Out. . .”: An Analysis of Judicial 
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1539–42 (1987); John Monahan 
& Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social 
Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479–95 (1986). 
67. See Michael J. Donaldson, Justice in Full is Time Well Spent: Why the Supreme 
Court Should Ban Sua Sponte Dismissals, 36 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 25, 43 (2017) (“When a 
court decides sua sponte, it is deciding without input of the people who know the most 
about the case—the parties and their counsel. This increases the likelihood that the court 
will miss some relevant statute, precedent, fact, or argument in making its decision.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look 
at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 313 (2002) (arguing 
that decisions rendered without input from the parties should carry less precedential weight 
than dicta); but see Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447 (2009) 
(defending the practice of federal judges injecting new legal issues into the cases before 
them). 
68. One answer may be that legal precedent is passed from case to case, but factual 
determinations are not. See Frost, supra note 67, at 493 (“Just as it is important for courts 
to respect stare decisis, it is essential that litigants not be allowed to slip its bonds simply 
by refusing to cite established precedent.”); see also GEYH ET AL., supra note 66, at § 5.04, 
5-25 (“Whereas judges are not presumptively experts on questions of fact, they are experts 
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cited cases the federal courts of appeals are getting from the 
parties’ briefs. We will not tell you whether that number is too 
few, too many, or just right. But future debate should be 
grounded in data, not in anecdote and perception. 
II. OUR METHODOLOGY
Now let’s talk about how we did it. For our dataset, we 
targeted recent published opinions of the federal courts of 
appeals. We selected the federal courts of appeals for a few 
reasons. First, we wanted to focus on federal rather than state 
courts. We figured that briefs filed in federal courts would be 
more easily accessible than many briefs filed in state courts, and, 
to be frank, we did not want to limit our audience by focusing on 
any particular state. 
Second, we knew that we did not want to focus our study 
on the United States Supreme Court. It is unique and therefore 
unrepresentative of courts in general. It is also over-studied 
relative to other courts, particularly considering its small 
caseload. And because it is not bound by precedent, it makes a 
poor subject for a study that touches on the communication of 
precedent. 
So that left federal district courts and federal courts of 
appeals. Because appellate cases follow a more consistent 
briefing lifecycle, it is simply easier to construct a consistent 
dataset out of appellate cases than trial cases. Appellate cases 
often progress along the same path: opening brief, response 
brief, and (maybe) reply brief. These briefs tend to be formal 
and contain tables of authorities. Trial cases can involve 
numerous types of motions, some of which are briefed and some 
of which are not, and perhaps even a trial. In the federal district 
courts, briefs tend to vary more in length, consistency, and 
formality. Also, many lack tables of authorities. Thus, in order 
to more easily construct a consistent dataset, we opted for the 
federal courts of appeals. 
To create a broad sample and avoid focusing on a single 
circuit that might turn out to be an outlier, we sampled cases 
from each of the thirteen federal courts of appeals. We also 
thought it would be interesting to have some data from every 
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Beyond that, we wanted to capture a random assortment of 
recent cases. Why recent? Because we wanted our data to be as 
current as possible. 
We wanted to capture cases in which a full opinion resulted 
from adversarial briefing. Thus, we excluded unpublished 
opinions, per curiam opinions, and memorandum opinions. We 
figured that these opinions were more likely to be short, to cite 
few authorities, or to contain sections that were cut and pasted 
from a court’s stockpile of generic language. Instead, we limited 
our dataset to only authored, published opinions. 
As for briefs, we limited our dataset to cases in which the 
briefs were available on Westlaw. We also excluded cases in 
which there were supplemental briefs or amicus briefs. We 
sought to capture truly mine-run cases: those that progressed 
along the traditional pathway of opening brief, response brief, 
and (maybe) reply brief.69
We generated our dataset by identifying the first twenty-
five cases from each circuit to meet our research criteria.70 First 
we would verify that the briefing in the case met our criteria and 
that the briefs were available on Westlaw.71 If the briefs met our 
69. Cases with amended briefs were not disqualified because an amended brief is not an 
additional brief. 
70. In this context, “we” means “us,” not “our research assistants.” We created separate 
spreadsheets for each of the thirteen circuits, which we called “circuit spreadsheets.” Here 
are the steps to creating a circuit spreadsheet. First, from the Westlaw main screen at 
https://www.westlaw.com/, select “Cases” under the “All Content” tab. Next, under 
“Federal Cases by Circuit,” select the desired circuit (e.g., “1st Circuit”). On the next page, 
select the court of appeals (e.g., “First Circuit Court of Appeals”). This leads to a database 
of that court’s cases. Within that database, restrict the results to those starting in 2017 by 
entering the following search: “advanced: DA(aft 12-31-2016 & bef 01-01-2018).” Then, 
under “Reported Status,” click the filter for only “Reported” cases. Then sort the results by 
date and go to the end of the search results to begin the screening process with the oldest 
opinion, which will be the opinion closest in time to January 1, 2017. (Note that these 
instructions were created during the latter half of 2017 and may no longer hold true after 
the conversion to Westlaw Edge.) 
71. The first criterion used to disqualify cases was whether the briefs were available on 
Westlaw because we found through experience that this was the most likely piece to be 
missing. So, after accessing the court’s opinion on Westlaw, we would click on the 
“Filings” tab to see which filings were available. Often the filings would lead to 
disqualification either because there were too few briefs available on Westlaw or because 
there were supplemental, amicus, or other additional briefs. If the briefing was very 
straightforward (e.g., Westlaw displayed only an opening, responsive, and reply brief) we 
ended our briefing investigation there. If the briefing was potentially within the bounds of 
our parameters but the filings available on Westlaw raised some suspicions (e.g., there was 
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criteria, we would turn our attention to the court’s opinion and 
verify that it was an authored, published opinion. For each 
circuit, we’d take the first twenty-five cases of 2017 that met 
those criteria.72 Although not randomized from a larger dataset, 
this approach comports with the methodology used previously 
by others.73 For some circuits it was relatively easy to find cases 
that met our criteria. For others, we had to assess hundreds of 
opinions to find twenty-five. Given the variation in the number 
of published cases issued by each court of appeals and the wide 
variation in the coverage of briefs available on Westlaw, each 
circuit’s dataset has a unique span of dates.74 For eight of the 
thirteen circuits, we were able to assemble our twenty-five cases 
from those issued by the end of March 2017. Thus, our dataset 
overwhelmingly comprises cases from the first half, and mostly 
the first quarter, of 2017.75 In all, our dataset comprises 325 
cases—far more than any previous study of citation stickiness.76
versions of briefs), then we investigated the court’s docket using the “Dockets Search” 
feature of Bloomberg Law’s “Litigation Intelligence Center.” See Litigation Intelligence 
Center, BLOOMBERG LAW ((June 19, 2018), https://www.bloomberglaw.com. For 
example, we would check to verify that there really was no reply brief filed in the case. If it 
turned out that there was a reply brief, but Westlaw did not have a copy, then the case 
would be disqualified from our dataset. Additionally, in the cases that aroused our 
suspicions, we verified whether the parties filed additional briefs (and, if so, disqualified 
the case from our dataset). 
72. In the Seventh Circuit, two cases that otherwise met our criteria were excluded 
because no cases were cited in the court’s opinions. See Hart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 845 
F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Gibbs, 845 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2017). While 
Judge Posner authored both opinions, one was accompanied by two concurring opinions 
that also cited no decisional authority. See Gibbs, 845 F.3d at 806 (Sykes & Kanne, JJ, 
concurring in the judgment, & Kanne, J, concurring). Because our primary research focus 
was determining whether the court’s case citations come from the briefs or elsewhere, we 
decided that it was sensible to exclude opinions that cited no cases. 
73. See, e.g., MARVELL, supra note 24, at 337 n.18 (describing the methodology of 
selecting thirty Sixth Circuit cases to study). 
74. The Eighth Circuit has the shortest range of dates—we found our twenty-five 
Eighth Circuit cases between January 1, 2017, and February 2, 2017. The Third Circuit 
took the largest range of dates for us to get our twenty-five cases: January 1, 2017, to July 
25, 2017. 
75. We considered staggering the start date of each circuit (e.g., starting the First 
Circuit with cases decided on January 1, starting the Second Circuit with cases decided on 
February 1, and so on). Ultimately, however, we failed to imagine any way in which 
starting every circuit on the same date would skew our results. Therefore, we opted to start 
every circuit on the same date for the sake of simplicity and consistency. 
76.  Previously, Dr. Marvell’s study from the 1970s contains the most comprehensive 
comparison of citations in briefs and opinions. See supra Section I.A. The Marvell study 
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Having assembled our dataset, we then turned to collecting 
the actual citation data so that we could compare the citations in 
each of the briefs with the citations in the resulting opinions. For 
this task, we primarily relied on one of our research assistants. 
For each case listed in each circuit spreadsheet, she used 
Westlaw to download the tables of authorities of each opinion 
and brief (opening, responsive, reply if any) in .docx format. At 
the time we conducted this study, Westlaw’s table-of-authorities 
feature captured cases cited in the opinion and briefs but not 
statutes, regulations, or legislative history. Only very rarely did 
the tables of authorities capture any non-decisional authority.77
Thus for each appeal listed in a circuit spreadsheet, we had three 
or four lists of case citations—one list for each brief or opinion. 
We then were able to compare the lists of case citations from 
each brief’s table of authorities to the case citations in the other 
briefs’ tables of authorities and to the cases cited in the resulting 
opinions.78
77. Other than judicial opinions, the materials that turned up in the Westlaw tables of 
authorities in our dataset were decisions of administrative agencies (classified as 
“Administrative Decision & Guidance”), patents (classified as “Intellectual Property”), and 
a lone American Law Report annotation (classified as “Secondary Sources”). We manually 
deleted the patent and ALR citations from our dataset, but we kept the citations to 
administrative adjudications because they were decisional in nature. For examples, click on 
Westlaw’s Table of Authorities tab for the briefs associated with the following database 
identification numbers: 2016 WL 1466312, 2014 WL 5421879, and 2016 WL 7435951. 
78. Although we summed the process in a single tidy sentence, the process itself was 
not so streamlined. Here’s what our team did: 
To mechanize the task of comparing the lists of cases, our research assistant used a 
markup program to convert each .docx document into a plain text document. This process 
stripped out the Westlaw formatting (including KeyCite flags), leaving each plain-text 
citation on the list in its own paragraph.  
Next, we used Excel spreadsheets to compare the plain-text lists of cited cases to one 
another. We wrote the necessary formulas in the spreadsheets, which compared the lists of 
citations to one another. Each appeal had its own spreadsheet that included five tabs: a tab 
for each of the three briefs, one for the opinion, and a summary sheet tabulating citation 
counts from the first three. Our research assistant pasted the lists of citations into the 
spreadsheets. For example, she pasted the list of case citations from the opening brief into 
column A of the first tab, then the list of case citations from the responsive brief into 
column A of the second tab, and so on. 
Because Westlaw’s table-of-authorities feature formatted each case citation 
identically, Excel’s comparing function could search for matches across the first four tabs 
in each spreadsheet. For example, the formulas in column B of the opening-brief sheet 
compared each case citation in column A with all of the case citations listed in the 
responsive brief, reply brief, and opinion sheets. If Excel found a match, it filled the 
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A few words on sample size. Our 325 judicial opinions 
contained 7552 unique case citations; the briefs in those 325 
cases contained 23,479 unique case citations. It is, then, useful 
to think in terms of citations—7552 in the opinions and 23,479 
in the briefs—rather than in terms of 325 cases. Because we 
tracked citations by the courts and the parties, the number of 
citations is the number that matters. Our sample size wasn’t 
twenty-five in each circuit, as if we looked at the briefs and 
opinions in twenty-five appeals. Rather, it was the hundreds of 
court-cited cases and the thousands of party-cited cases in each 
set of briefs and resulting opinion. With this background in 
mind, read on to learn what we found.79
III. OUR RESULTS
This part summarizes the results of our study and visualizes 
the most important results using charts. The results focus on 
measures of citation stickiness because that was our primary 
question, but our study measured a few other things like average 
number of cases cited per opinion, so we included non-citation-
stickiness results where they seemed interesting. In addition to 
figuring out what the overall stickiness percentage was, we were 
looking for characteristics that might have affected the number 
of sticky citations in a particular opinion—perhaps the type of 
appeal or the authoring judge’s level of experience. To that end, 
we calculated the percentage of sticky citations of different 
a “0.” The summary sheets contained formulas that took those counts and tabulated how 
many cases were in each brief or opinion, how many were in briefs but not the opinion, 
how many were in one or two briefs only, how many cases were cited in both parties’ 
briefs and the opinion, and—of course—how many cases were cited in the opinion that 
were also cited in at least one of the briefs (i.e., how many citations were sticky). 
Finally, we collected all of the summary counts into a single master spreadsheet that 
contained data about all 325 appeals in our datasets. With this dataset we were able to 
calculate not only stickiness percentages for the appeals as a whole, but also stickiness 
percentages for specific parts of the dataset by using different characteristics of the appeals 
and authoring judges. 
79. Although we were primarily interested in citation stickiness, we amassed data on a 
variety of other fronts because we thought the results were likely to be interesting. We 
coded for the information that was available on Westlaw at the outset (for example, 
Westlaw’s categorization of each case’s topic and the name of the authoring judge). This 
information allowed us to slice and dice the stickiness data based on the various 
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subsets of our data, divided by characteristic. Just to manage 
your expectations, our results are primarily counting, 
percentages, and averages (means). For some of the percentages 
and means, we calculated 95% confidence intervals using the 
Exact test in Stata.80
Our most common calculation was for citation stickiness, 
which is a proportion. We calculated the proportion of sticky 
cites in various subsets of briefs and opinions. A convenient 
feature of citation stickiness as a measurement is that it’s easy to 
calculate, as Figure 1 shows: for opinions, tally the number of 
cases in an opinion also cited in at least one party’s brief, and 
divide by the number of cases cited in the opinion. For briefs, 
tally the number of cases in a brief also cited in the opinion, and 
divide by the total number of cases cited in the brief. 
Figure 1 
Equations for Calculating Citation Stickiness and Super-Stickiness
Sticky cites in opinion = 
Sticky cites in brief = 
Super-sticky cites in opinion = 
This part first describes our “big picture” results: aspects of 
citation stickiness within our whole dataset, including by 
circuit.81 It then compares the stickiness of cases cited in 
winning briefs and the stickiness of cases cited in losing briefs, 
using the appeals in our dataset with clear winners and losers. 
And last, it summarizes the stickiness of opinions authored by 
judges with particular characteristics, including political 
affiliation and experience. 
80. These confidence intervals are noted in footnotes when we first mention a particular 
result. A confidence interval expresses the percentage probability that data lies between 
two limits. See, e.g., ALAN R. JONES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND OTHER FRIGHTENING 
STUFF 102 (2019). 
81. If you aren’t going to read this whole article, but you are looking for a little 
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A. The Big Picture: Stickiness Percentages 
and Number of Cases Cited 
Using the nomenclature we invented,82 the overall 
stickiness percentage in our 325-opinion dataset was 49%.83
This means that 49% of the 7552 cases that were cited in the 
courts’ opinions had been cited by at least one party in a brief. 
The other 51% were endogenous—they originated from 
somewhere else, most likely the courts’ own research.84 Of all 
the cases cited in the 325 opinions, only 21% were cited in both 
parties’ briefs. To coin some more nomenclature, we have 
referred to cases that were cited in both parties’ briefs and then 
again in the opinion as super sticky. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate 
these overall stickiness and super-stickiness percentages of the 
opinions in our dataset. 
Another way of looking at the stickiness data is from the 
perspective of the briefs, rather than the opinions. In our 325-
case dataset, the parties cited 23,479 cases. Of those, only 16% 
were later cited by the courts in their opinions—or to use our 
nomenclature, were sticky. And of the 4276 cases cited by both 
parties in their briefs, only 38% were sticky. In other words, if a 
party cited a case in a brief, there was only a 16% chance that 
the court would also cite that same case—and an 84% likelihood 
that the court would not mention the case. And even for a case 
that both parties cited—the universe of cases that the parties 
agreed were worth discussing—there was only a 38% chance 
that the court would cite the case—and a 62% likelihood that the 
court wouldn’t. Figure 4 illustrates the overall stickiness of 
citations from the briefs in our dataset. 
Note that we follow the same graphical conventions for all 
our figures: solid dark gray for analysis of sticky citations in 
opinions (like Figure 2), black with white dots for analysis of 
super-sticky citations in opinions (like Figure 3), and white with 
82. A case citation in a brief is sticky if it later appears in the court’s opinion; if it does 
not appear there, then it is unsticky. A case citation in an opinion is sticky if it first 
appeared in any party’s brief; if it appeared for the first time in the court’s opinion, then it 
is endogenous. If you need more of a refresher, turn back to the first page of this article. 
83. The 95% confidence interval = 47.8%–50.1%. 
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black squares for analysis of sticky citations in briefs (like 
Figure 4). 
The distribution of our stickiness results, displayed in 
Figure 5, is mostly bell-shaped, with the center of the bell at 51 
to 60% (with 55 cases in that range) and an overall peak at 31 to 
40% (with 67 cases in that range). The two cases with stickiness 
of 10% or less involved briefs that cited relatively few cases (11 
in one, 42 in the other). On the other end of the chart, nine 
opinions contained 100% sticky citations—all of the case cites 
in the opinions originated in the parties’ briefs. Those opinions 
tended to include few case citations, eight citing ten cases or 
fewer,85 and the last eleven. For comparison, the mean number 
of cases cited per opinion in all cases was 23.2 and the mean 
number cited in the parties’ briefs was 72.2. 
Figure 5 
Overall Distribution of Stickiness Percentages 
85. Indeed, two of the opinions cited only a single case. Both opinions were authored 
by Judge Posner. 
Figure 2 
Sticky Citations in 
All Opinions  
Figure 3 
Super-Sticky Cases 
in All Opinions 
Figure 4 
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We hoped to gain a bit more insight into our overall dataset 
by comparing the top and bottom quintiles of all of our 
stickiness data (the opinions in the top and bottom 20% in terms 
of citation stickiness). Each quintile was composed of sixty-five 
opinions. The opinions in the top quintile ranged from 70% to 
100% sticky, with a mean stickiness of 79%.86 The opinions in 
the bottom quintile ranged from 6% to 33% sticky, with a mean 
stickiness of 26%.87 On average, the opinions in the bottom 
quintile cited about two-thirds the number of cases as those in 
the top quintile. The bottom quintile opinions also cited more 
than twice as many sticky cases as the top-quintile opinions. 
Thus the least-sticky opinions cited about one and a half times 
the number of cases as the stickiest opinions, but that larger 
number of case cites included fewer than half the number of 
cases cited by the parties as the stickiest opinions. Or, in simpler 
terms: the least-sticky opinions cite a lot of cases but very few 
from the briefs. 
Looking at the top and bottom quintiles by number of cases 
cited revealed the same pattern. The quintile of opinions in our 
dataset that cited the most cases cited an average 47.5 cases and 
were 45% sticky. But the quintile of opinions in our dataset that 
cited the fewest cases cited an average of only 7.9 cases and 
were 60% sticky. 
B. Stickiness by Circuit 
To refresh your recollection, we analyzed citation data from 
twenty-five cases in each of the thirteen circuits. Because each 
circuit exists as a separate solar system of precedent, we 
hypothesized that there might be some variation in the stickiness 
rate among the circuits. For example, circuits may have different 
cultures regarding how they approach parties’ briefs and the 
authorities cited in them or different norms regarding 
independent legal research. Moreover, each circuit has a non-
homogeneous pool of binding precedent. Factors such as the age 
of the circuit, its case load, and its rate of publication would 
influence how much binding case law is available in each 
86. The 95% confidence interval = 76.3%–81.2%. 
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circuit.88 Differences in the quantity of available binding case 
law may affect citation stickiness. 
Twenty-five cases per circuit resulted in an average of 581 
case citations in the opinions and an average of 1806 cited cases 
in the briefs. Those data are summarized in Figures 6 and 7, but 
here are the highlights: stickiness percentages ranged from 
42%89 in the Third Circuit to 57%90 in the Eighth. Super-
stickiness percentages ranged from 16% in the Third Circuit to 
31% in the D.C. Circuit. The Third Circuit also cited the highest 
number of cases per opinion (31.8), double that of the Seventh 
(15.9). A case cited in a party’s brief had the lowest chances of 
being cited by the court in the Seventh Circuit (11%) and the 
highest in the First (20%). Even though the Third Circuit 
produced opinions with the lowest stickiness percentages and 
the largest number of case citations, an above-average 
percentage of cases cited to the Third Circuit were cited in the 
opinions: 18%. (The average for all circuits and cases was 16%.) 
That brings us to the average number of cases cited in the 
parties’ briefs. Overall, the average set of briefs cited 72.2 cases, 
more than three times the average number of cases cited by the 
court (23.2).  The parties in the Federal Circuit cited the fewest 
cases (57.2), and parties in the Second Circuit cited the most 
(92.5). For more detail by circuit, see Appendix A.  
88. For example, the Eleventh Circuit and the Federal Circuit date back only to the 
early 1980s, although decisions of their predecessor courts were adopted as binding. See
South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Bonnor v. City of 
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207–11 (11th Cir. 1981). 
89. The 95% confidence interval = 38.4%–45.3%. 
90. The 95% confidence interval = 51.9%–61.4%. 
Figure 6 
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C. Stickiness by Case Characteristics 
Of our 325 opinions, about two-thirds were civil (213) and 
one third were criminal (112).91 Within the broad civil-criminal 
divide, the 325 opinions also covered many different topics. We 
hypothesized that case type could affect citation stickiness for a 
variety of reasons, including the fact that the quantity of 
available binding precedent would differ depending on case 
type. For example, the circuits may be relatively richer in 
binding precedent for civil matters (or particular types of civil 
matters) when compared to criminal matters. Variations in the 
amount of available binding precedent may affect citation 
stickiness. Moreover, criminal prosecutions involve government 
attorneys on one or both sides, whereas civil cases often involve 
private attorneys on both sides. Briefs by government and 
private attorneys might have different stickiness percentages, so 
we hypothesized that looking at broad categories of cases could 
provide a very rough proxy for this information. 
As it turns out, the two categories of cases had similar 
stickiness percentages, with 48% of the cases cited in civil 
91. For our purposes, the distinction between civil and criminal cases was based on the 
Westlaw-designated topic. Westlaw designates most opinions with both a topic and sub-
topic. We categorized cases as “Criminal” if their main topic was “Criminal Justice”; all 
other cases were categorized as “Civil.” (There is no “civil” main topic in Westlaw; 
examples of other main topics include “Copyright,” “Environmental Law,” and “Labor and 
Employment.”) Using this method, habeas corpus cases are categorized as criminal. 
Figure 7 
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opinions being sticky92 and only a slightly higher 51% of the 
cases cited in criminal opinions being sticky,93 as shown in 
Figure 8. The super-stickiness percentages were an identical 
21%. Civil and criminal opinions also cited a similar number of 
cases, civil opinions citing an average of 22.4 cases and criminal 
opinions citing an average of 24.8. The parties in criminal cases 
brought fewer cases to the courts’ attention, on average citing 
65.9 cases in each set of briefs. On average, each set of civil 
briefs cited 74.9 cases. A case cited in a criminal brief had a 
higher likelihood of getting cited in the resulting opinion (19%) 
than a case cited in a civil brief (14%) as shown in Figure 9, 
which makes sense given similar stickiness percentages. 
Figure 8 
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Civil and Criminal Opinions
             Civil Opinions                                 Criminal Opinions 
             
Figure 9 
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Civil and Criminal Briefs 
 Civil Briefs                                   Criminal Briefs
92. The 95% confidence interval = 46.4%–49.2%. 
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Our 325 opinions covered seventy-one different Westlaw 
“topics,” ranging from Administrative Practice to Weapons. 
Many of those topics were assigned to only one (Espionage) or a 
few (Fraud) opinions in our dataset. We identified eight 
Westlaw topics that appeared at least ten times in our dataset—
Bankruptcy, Civil Rights, Commercial Law, Government, Labor 
and Employment, Litigation, Patents, and Sentencing—and 
calculated stickiness percentages for each. These percentages are 
summarized in Figure 10, but here are the high points. The 
stickiest topic94 was Government (53%) and the least sticky was 
Bankruptcy (41%). Government and Bankruptcy opinions also 
had the highest and lowest percentage of super-sticky cites (28% 
and 16%, respectively). But cites in Patents and Government 
briefs were the least sticky (12%), and cites in Sentencing briefs 
were the most sticky (21%). Patents and Sentencing briefs also 
tended to cite the fewest cases (55.3 and 52.7), while 
Bankruptcy and Litigation briefs cited the most (78.5 and 83.7). 
D. Stickiness by Type of Brief 
Although so far we’ve largely reported citation-stickiness 
data from the opinions perspective, we also looked at stickiness 
from the perspective of the briefs. This section describes how 
94. Yes, we realize that the topic itself isn’t actually sticky. Rather, it was citations in 
the briefs and opinions associated with the topic that were sticky. But hopefully you’ll 
allow us a little latitude; it is our nomenclature after all. 
Figure 10 
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sticky the citations were in the briefs we studied.95 All 325 
appeals in our dataset included an opening brief filed by the 
appellant and a responsive brief filed by the appellee.96 Most of 
them—295—also included a reply brief. We hypothesized that 
differences in stickiness rates among the briefs could shed some 
light on how much weight the briefs carried with the court; for 
example, a very low stickiness percentage for reply briefs could 
indicate that reply briefs are rarely worth filing. 
The three types of briefs had similar percentages of cited 
cases stick to the resulting opinions: 19% cited in opening 
briefs, 21% cited in responsive briefs, and 21% cited in reply 
briefs were sticky. Taking account of overlapping cases cited by 
appellants in their opening briefs and reply briefs, 17% of cases 
cited by appellants were sticky. Of cases cited by both parties’ 
briefs, 38% were cited in the opinions (these are the super-sticky 
citations). Figure 11 shows these stickiness percentages. 
Figure 11 
Stickiness by Type of Brief 
              Opening Brief                    Responsive Brief                          Reply Brief 
                 Stickiness                                Stickiness                                 Stickiness 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
        Opening + Reply Briefs Stickiness97            Both Parties’ Briefs Stickiness
                                                                                                                                           
95. We also calculated the average number of cases cited per brief, which is potentially 
interesting to some readers: responsive briefs cited the most cases, an average of 40.5. 
Opening briefs cited about six fewer, an average of 34.4 cases. And reply briefs cited the 
fewest cases, an average of 19.8. 
Of the 40.5 cases cited in the average responsive brief, an average of 30.8 cases were 
not cited in the opening briefs. Of those 30.8 cases, an average of 3.7 were cited in the 
reply brief. Thus, an average of 27.1 cases introduced by the appellee were not cited by the 
appellant in the reply. However, of the 3.7 cases introduced by the responsive brief and 
then cited in the reply brief, 26% were later cited in the opinion. 
96. In some cases, the parties were petitioners and respondents rather than appellants 
and appellees, but this did not affect our analysis. 
97. The “Opening + Reply Briefs” pie chart  in Figure 11 shows a combined result based 
on unique citations. If the appellant cited a case in both the opening brief and the reply, we 
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E. Stickiness by Winning and Losing Briefs 
A prime candidate for Top Stickiness Influencer is 
winningness. We hypothesized that opinions would cite more 
cases from the winners’ briefs than the losers’ because the 
opinions would be more likely to align with the winning briefs’ 
reasoning (although the opinions should also include some 
explanation of why the losing briefs’ reasoning is flawed). 
Moreover, judges may use the winning briefs as a jumping off 
point when drafting the opinion. Our calculations showed that 
our prediction was correct, but the effect was relatively small. 
Of the 325 appeals in our dataset, 297 had a clear winner 
and a clear loser; the others were more muddled (for example, 
reversals- and affirmations-in-part). Of those 297 clear-result 
cases, the appellant won eighty-six and the appellee won 201. 
Forty-one percent98 of the cases cited in those 297 opinions were 
also cited by the winning party, while only 32%99 were cited by 
the loser, as illustrated by Figure 12. So our research reveals a 
9% difference between the likelihood that a case cited in the 
opinion came from the winning party rather than from the losing 
party. Most of the cases cited by the winner were also cited by 
the loser, and vice versa: 22%100 of the cases in the opinions 
were cited by both parties. 
Figure 12 
Percentage of Sticky Citations First Cited in  
Winners’ and Losers’ Briefs 
       Winner Cites in Opinions                                   Loser Cites in Opinions         
       
Considering stickiness from the briefs perspective, 21% of 
cases cited by winners in their briefs made it into the opinions, 
while 17% of cases cited by losers made it into the opinions, as 
illustrated by Figure 13. Of the smaller universe of cases cited 
98. The 95% confidence interval = 39.3%–41.8%. 
99. The 95% confidence interval = 31.3%–33.7%. 
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by both parties in these 297 cases, 35% made it into an opinion. 
Winners and losers cited about the same number of cases in their 
briefs: an average of 40.2 in winners’ briefs and 39.7 in losers’ 
briefs.101 The appellant also cited about the same number of 
cases in winning and losing reply briefs: 19.9 cases in winning 
reply briefs and 18.2 cases in losing reply briefs. 
Figure 13 
Percentage of Sticky Citations from Winners’ Briefs 
and Losers’ Briefs 
              Cites from Winners’ Briefs                          Cites from Losers’ Briefs 
                                                                                                                     
Comparing opinions in which the appellant won to opinions 
in which the appellee won, there isn’t much difference in 
stickiness. Opinions in which the appellant won contained 
48%102 sticky citations, and opinions in which the appellee won 
contained 52%103 sticky citations. Considering stickiness from 
the briefs perspective, 15% of the cases cited by winning 
appellants made it into an opinion, and 16% of the cases cited by 
winning appellees made it into an opinion. We did notice a 
marked difference in the stickiness of cases introduced by the 
appellee and then cited by the appellant in the reply brief: when 
the appellant won, only 19% of those cases were cited in the 
opinion, but when the appellee won, 29% of those cases were 
cited in the opinion. 
F. Stickiness by Judicial Characteristics 
One reason we chose to include only authored opinions in 
our dataset was so that we could look at various characteristics 
of the authoring judges to see if they had any effect on citation 
101. These calculations include the total number of cases cited in both the opening and 
reply briefs, if both were present. 
102. The 95% confidence interval = 45.4%–50.0%. 
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stickiness. We hypothesized that judges likely have varying 
levels of enthusiasm for outside legal research and varying 
approaches to opinion writing. We further hypothesized that 
some trait or combination of traits may correlate with increased 
or reduced stickiness. 
Our full 325-opinion dataset included thirty-four appeals 
that produced multiple opinions, meaning a majority opinion 
plus at least one dissenting or concurring opinion. To keep 
things clean, we omitted those thirty-four opinions from our 
study of the authoring judges. That left 291 opinions with 
single-judge authorship. 
For the judges authoring those 291 opinions, we looked at 
the following characteristics: political affiliation of the 
appointing President; the appointing President; the law school 
that awarded the judge’s primary law degree; whether the judge 
was sitting by designation;104 and various measures of 
experience, including the numbers of years since the judge’s 
birth, since the judge received her law degree, since the judge 
became a judge, and since the judge received her current 
commission.105
1. Stickiness by Political Affiliation of Appointing President 
We hypothesized that political ideology may affect a 
judges’ approach to relying on independent legal research when 
drafting opinions.106 We followed the approach of previous 
researchers and used the political affiliation of the President who 
appointed the judge as a proxy for the judge’s ideology.107
104. Twenty opinions in our judge-characteristic dataset were authored by judges 
sitting by designation—meaning they were hearing cases outside their home courts. Most 
were district court judges, but four of the opinions in our dataset were authored by 
appellate judges sitting by designation in circuits other than their own. 
105. We gathered the judicial-characteristics data from the Federal Judicial Center’s 
website. See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–present, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR. (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges. 
106. Judicial ideology is the subject of numerous studies, notwithstanding the fact that 
it is neither easy to define nor easy to measure. See generally Joshua B. Fischman & David 
S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It? 29 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 133 (2009) (describing the theoretical problems inherent in defining “judicial 
ideology” and the methodological problems inherent in measuring it). 
107. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and 
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Of the 291 opinions in our judge-characteristic dataset, 139 
were authored by judges appointed by Democratic Presidents, 
and 152 were authored by judges appointed by Republican 
Presidents. The stickiness of the two sets of opinions was 
similar: opinions authored by Democratic-affiliated judges 
contained 48%108 sticky citations, and opinions authored by 
Republican-affiliated judges contained 52%109 sticky citations, 
as illustrated by Figure 14.110 Twenty percent of the citations by 
Democratic-affiliated judges had been cited by both parties (i.e., 
were super-sticky), and 23% of citations by Republican-
affiliated judges were super-sticky. Cases cited by both parties 
had about the same likelihood of being cited by judges of either 
affiliation, with 16% of cases cited by the parties appearing in 
opinions by Democratic-affiliated judges and 15% appearing in 
opinions by Republican-affiliated judges, as illustrated by Figure 
15. Democratic-affiliated judges cited more cases per opinion—
an average of 23.6 cases—to Republican-affiliated judges’ 20.8. 
L.J. 2155, 2168 (1998); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the 
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1718–19 (1997); see also Fischman & Law, supra note 
106, at 167 (“The most popular proxy for a judge’s ideology, however, has been the party 
of the official who appointed the judge.”); but see Fischman & Law, supra note 106, at 
169–72 (noting potential limitations of using the political party of the appointing president 
as a proxy for judicial ideology). 
108. The 95% confidence interval = 46.7%–50.2%. 
109. The 95% confidence interval = 50.3%–53.8%. 
110. Here’s a fun aside: before presenting our initial research results at an academic 
conference, we conducted two informal polls asking what characteristics folks thought 
would reveal the biggest variance in stickiness. We posted one on Twitter the day before 
our presentation and conducted the other by a show of hands at the beginning of our 
presentation. One of the poll options was political affiliation of the appointing president. 
Given the rhetoric around the supposedly different judging habits of Democratic-affiliated 
and Republican-affiliated judges, we expected political affiliation to be a popular answer. 
We were wrong. Quite wrong. Zero of the thirty Twitter users who responded selected this 
answer. And zero of the thirty or so presentation attendees selected it either. Zero! 
Figure 14 
Percentage of Sticky Citations Used in Opinions by 
Democratic-Affiliated Judges and Republican-Affiliated Judges 
               Democratic-Affiliated                              Republican-Affiliated
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Next, we drilled down to the actual appointing president, 
whether Barack Obama (82), George W. Bush (73), Bill Clinton 
(48), George H.W. Bush (37), Ronald Reagan (39), Jimmy 
Carter (9), Gerald Ford (2), or Richard Nixon (1). 
Figure 16 
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Opinions, by President Who Appointed Judge 
    Nixon (1)                     Ford (2)                       Carter (9)                   Reagan (39)
                                 
   
 G.H.W. Bush (37) Clinton (48) 
                                    
G.W. Bush (73) Obama (82)
          
We didn’t see an obvious pattern of citation stickiness that 
matched political ideology, illustrated in Figure 16. The single 
opinion authored by the judge appointed by President Nixon had 
the highest stickiness percentage: 73%.111 And the two opinions 
111. The 95% confidence interval = 56.1%–85.4%. 
Figure 15 
Percentage of Sticky Citations from Briefs Used in Opinions by 
Democratic-Affiliated Judges and Republican-Affiliated Judges  
              Democratic-Affiliated                            Republican-Affiliated
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authored by judges appointed by President Ford had the lowest 
stickiness percentage: 36%.112 The nine opinions authored by 
judges appointed by President Carter were a bit higher at 
41%.113 The number of cases cited in these three sets of opinions 
also varied widely, with the Nixon appointee citing forty cases, 
the Ford appointees citing an average of 42.5 cases, and the 
Carter appointees citing an average of 24.7 cases. However, one, 
two, and nine are pretty small as sample sizes go. 
Looking at the next grouping of opinions, those authored 
by judges appointed by Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, 
and Clinton, the stickiness percentages get a bit closer to the 
49% overall average (and the average of 50% for opinions in the 
judge-characteristic dataset). The citations in the thirty-nine 
opinions authored by Reagan appointees were 52% sticky,114 the 
citations in the thirty-seven opinions authored by George H.W. 
Bush appointees were 57% sticky,115 and the citations in the 
forty-eight opinions authored by Clinton appointees were 49% 
sticky.116 The number of opinions cited in these three sets of 
opinions varied, with the Reagan appointees citing an average of 
15.8 cases per opinion,117 the George H.W. Bush appointees 
citing an average of 21.5 cases per opinion, and the Clinton 
appointees citing an average of 26.1 cases per opinion. 
The last two groups of opinions were authored by the most 
recently appointed judges, those appointed by Presidents George 
W. Bush and Obama. There was no stickiness difference 
between these two groups of opinions. The cases cited in the 
seventy-three opinions authored by George W. Bush appointees 
were 49% sticky,118 and the opinions cited an average of 22.3 
cases. The cases cited in the eighty-two opinions authored by 
112. The 95% confidence interval = 26.2%–47.6%. A possibly interesting tidbit is that 
despite the 37% difference in stickiness between the Nixon appointee’s opinion and the 
Ford appointees’ opinions, the likelihood of a case cited in the briefs later being cited in the 
opinion was nearly identical for these judges. Twenty-three percent of the cases cited by 
the parties made it into the Ford appointees’ opinions and 24% made it into the Nixon 
appointee’s opinion. 
113. The 95% confidence interval = 34.9%–48.2%. 
114. The 95% confidence interval = 48.3%–56.4%. 
115. The 95% confidence interval = 53.3%–60.4%. 
116. The 95% confidence interval = 46.0%–51.7%. 
117. The Reagan-appointee opinions include four by Judge Posner, who cited a total of 
thirteen cases. 
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Obama appointees were 49% sticky,119 and the opinions cited an 
average of 22.0 cases. The super-stickiness percentages were 
also identical—21% for both George W. Bush and Obama 
appointees. As was the likelihood of a case cited in a brief later 
being cited in the opinion—15% for both. 
2. Stickiness by Law School Attended 
Next, we turned to the very serious question of whether the 
law school attended by the authoring judge affected the 
stickiness percentages in the opinions.120 We limited our 
analysis to law schools that appeared at least ten times121 in our 
judge-characteristic dataset. The eight law schools that met this 
criterion—Boston University (10 opinions), Georgetown (13), 
Harvard (43), Michigan (14), Texas (11), Tulane (10), Virginia 
(16), and Yale (23)—are shown in Figure 17. The least sticky 
law school was Georgetown, with alumni-authored opinions 
yielding an average stickiness of 40%.122 The stickiest was 
Boston University, with alumni-authored opinions yielding an 
average stickiness of 61%.123 The schools with the most 
opinions in our dataset, Harvard and Yale, were close to the 
50% mean for the judge-characteristic dataset, with 51% and 
49% stickiness, respectively. Opinions authored by Yale 
graduates cited the most cases, an average of 30.2 per opinion, 
nearly double the average of 16.8 cited in opinions by Virginia 
graduates. 
119. The 95% confidence interval = 46.7%–51.3%. 
120. Okay, maybe this one was not such a very serious question, but it is measurable 
and folks seem interested in knowing the answer. Moreover, differences in the approaches 
that various schools take to training their law students may affect how the schools’ 
graduates approach opinion-writing years later when they ascend to the federal bench. 
121. This does not mean law schools attended by at least ten judges in our dataset. It 
means that at least ten opinions were authored by judges who attended these law schools; 
for example, the judge-characteristic dataset includes four opinions authored by Judge 
Posner, which would count as four opinions for Harvard. 
122. The 95% confidence interval = 34.0%–45.5%. 
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Figure 17 
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Opinions, 
by Authoring Judge’s Law School 
Boston University (10)                 Tulane (10)               University of Virginia (16)     
                                                       
               Harvard (43)                           Yale (23)                       Michigan (14)  
                                                     
                                       Texas (11)                           Georgetown (16) 
                                                                                                                                                         
3. Stickiness by Whether Judge Sat by Designation 
Of the 291 cases in our judge-characteristic dataset, twenty 
were authored by judges sitting by designation. Of those 
opinions, four were by appeals court judges and sixteen were 
authored by district court judges. We had expected judges who 
were sitting by designation to write opinions with notably 
different stickiness percentages than opinions authored by 
judges sitting with their home courts. However, it was less clear 
to us which way the results would cut. A judge sitting away 
from her home court is likely less familiar with the governing 
law she is called upon to apply. That may drive her to rely more 
heavily upon the briefs or to engage more heavily in 
independent research. Either way, we figured it would have 
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We were wrong. Judges sitting by designation wrote 
opinions that were 49% sticky,124 and judges sitting with their 
home courts wrote opinions that were 50% sticky,125 as 
illustrated by Figure 18. The percentages were similarly close 
for trial and appellate judges: district court judges wrote 
opinions that were 51% sticky, and appellate judges wrote 
opinions that were 50% sticky, as shown in Figure 19. 
Judges sitting by designation did tend to cite six more cases 
per opinion than did judges sitting with their home courts. The 
difference between district and appellate judges in the group of 
designated judges was smaller; they cited an average of 25.1 and 
22.0 cases per opinion, respectively.126
124. The 95% confidence interval = 44.5%–53.1%. 
125. The 95% confidence interval = 48.9%–51.5%. 
126. The four opinions authored by appellate judges sitting by designation contained a 
much higher number of citations on average: 36.3. 
Figure 18 
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Opinions, 
by Judges Sitting with Home Court or Sitting by Designation 
Sitting with Home Court (271)        Sitting by Designation (20) 
                             
Figure 19 
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Opinions,  
by Designated District Judges and Designated Appellate Judges 
Appellate Judges (275)         District Judges (16) 
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4. Stickiness by Judicial Experience 
Finally, we looked at various aspects of judicial experience: 
years since primary law degree, years since current judicial 
commission, years since birth,127 total number of judging 
years,128 and senior or active status. We hypothesized that 
judicial experience might correlate with increased or decreased 
citation stickiness. Perhaps inexperienced judges would rely 
more heavily on the authorities cited by the parties, or perhaps 
their lack of experience would drive them to thoroughly research 
the law in an effort to educate themselves. Perhaps more 
experienced judges would give less weight to the parties’ briefs 
and arguments and therefore be more likely to diverge from the 
authorities cited by the parties. Or perhaps age and experience 
would correlate with a sort of judicial lethargy in which the 
judge becomes less likely to look beyond the parties’ briefs. 
With the exception of the binary categories of senior and 
active status, we calculated citation stickiness for all the 
experience categories by dividing the data into decade-long 
buckets: one to ten years, eleven to twenty years, and so on. We 
expected judicial experience to affect stickiness, but overall we 
didn’t observe any consistent pattern. The results are 
summarized visually in Figures 20 through 25, but if you prefer 
to read the results in text form, buckle up for the next five 
paragraphs. 
Let’s start with years since birth. The youngest judges in 
our judge-characteristic dataset were, in 2017, between 41 and 
50 years out from their births. As Figure 20 shows, the youngest 
cohort authored seventeen opinions in our dataset and had the 
second-lowest stickiness: 48%. This cohort also cited the fewest 
cases in their opinions, an average of 18.9. The next four cohorts 
(51 to 60, 61 to 70, 71 to 80, and 81 to 90) had stickiness 
percentages hovering around the 49% mean, but gradually 
increasing as their age increased (respectively, 49%, 49%, 49%, 
127. To calculate the number of years since birth, we subtracted the year of the judge’s 
birth from the year 2017, the year from which we collected data. We did not use age 
because the benefits seemed minimal compared to the cost of calculating each judge’s age 
at the time the opinion was issued. 
128. Many federal judges have prior judging experience on a state court, another federal 
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52%, and 52%). The oldest cohort of judges, who were between 
91 and 100 years out from their births, authored three opinions. 
These opinions had the lowest stickiness—45%. The five age-
range cohorts cited a similar number of cases in their opinions 
(respectively, 21.5, 23.4, 20.9, 24.2, and 22.0). 
After being born, the next step to becoming a judge in our 
dataset is attaining a law degree. Figure 21 shows that there 
were four opinions in our dataset by judges who had attained 
their law degrees between eleven and twenty years before 2017. 
Those four opinions had the lowest stickiness percentage—43%. 
The next five cohorts (21 to 30, 31 to 40, 41 to 50, 51 to 60, and 
61 to 70) had similar stickiness percentages (respectively, 51%, 
50%, 49%, 51%, and 55%). Those who had been law school 
graduates the longest did cite notably more cases per opinion: 
31.6 as compared to 22.8, 20.3, 22.2, 22.6, and 21.1. 
At some point after attaining their law degrees, the judges 
in our dataset were of course commissioned as federal appellate 
judges.129 The most newly minted of them had received their 
commissions between one and ten years before 2017. These 
judges authored opinions that contained citations that were 49% 
sticky. In fact, as you can see from Figure 22, years since 
commission didn’t seem to move stickiness much one way or 
the other. The next four cohorts (11 to 20 years, 21 to 30 years, 
31 to 40 years, and 41 to 50 years) had similar stickiness 
percentages (respectively, 48%, 55%, 49%, and 48%). The 
greatest variation in cases cited was between the two longest-
commissioned cohorts: opinions by judges who had been 
commissioned for between 31 and 40 years cited an average of 
17.5 cases, and opinions by judges who had been commissioned 
for between 41 and 50 years cited an average of 41.7 cases. 
However, there were only three opinions in the last group. 
129. When we mention a judge’s years since commission, what we mean is the years 
since the judge was commissioned on whatever court she was on when she authored the 
opinion in our dataset. For judges not sitting by designation, that is the same court that 
rendered the opinion. As an example, for a First Circuit opinion authored by a First Circuit 
judge, the judge’s years since commission would be the number of years since her 
commission on the First Circuit. Prior judging experience, including prior judging 
experience as a federal district court judge, was not included. However, for a district court 
judge sitting by designation, we measured the years since the judge was commissioned as a 
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Our penultimate category was total judging experience, 
which is reported in Figure 23. We added up each judge’s years 
of judging—whether as a state judge or on any federal court. 
The least-experienced cohort of judges had been judging for 
between one and ten years. These judges authored forty-six of 
the opinions in our judge-characteristic dataset, and these 
opinions contained citations that were 48% sticky. The next four 
cohorts (11 to 20 years, 21 to 30 years, 31 to 40 years, and 41 to 
50 years) also had stickiness percentages around the mean 
(respectively, 49%, 54%, 47%, and 49%). The most-experienced 
cohort, judges who had been judging for between 51 and 60 
years, authored opinions with the least sticky citations, having 
an average of 44%. However, there were only two opinions in 
that cohort. The number of cases cited per opinion didn’t vary 
much across the cohorts: 20.7, 25.0, 21.8, 20.9, 20.4, and 26.0. 
At last, we reach senior and active status. Federal judges 
may take senior status based on their age and years of service; 
thus, it is a proxy for experience.130 Within our judge-
characteristic dataset, 224 opinions were authored by active-
status judges and 67 opinions were authored by senior-status 
judges. We didn’t see a great difference in stickiness: opinions 
authored by senior judges contained citations that were 48% 
sticky131 and opinions authored by active judges contained 
citations that were 51% sticky.132 Active judges cited fewer 
cases in their opinions, an average of 20.9 to senior judges’ 26.2. 
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)(1), (c); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 32 (1996) (explaining the criteria for senior status); 
Stephen B. Burbank, S. Jay Plager & Gregory Ablavsky, Leaving the Bench, 1970–2009: 
The Choices Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their 
Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11, 19–20 (2012) (same). 
131. The 95% confidence interval = 49.5%–52.3%. 
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Stickiness by Years Since Judge's Law Degree 
Figure 22 
Stickiness by Years Since Judge's Commission 
Figure 23 
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Figure 24 
Stickiness by Judge’s Active or Senior Status 
Active Status (224) Senior Status (67) 
                   
The text and figures in the section that you just read 
describe an overview of our results. You can find a more 
detailed presentation of the results in Appendices A, B, C, and 
D.
IV. WHAT IT ALL MIGHT MEAN
So what do these results mean? Depending on what you 
want to know, they mean either a great deal or not very much at 
all. 
If you want to know how often federal courts of appeals 
cite to the same authorities as the parties, then our results will 
tell you a lot. Forty-nine percent of the cases cited in published, 
authored federal appellate opinions were previously cited in at 
least one of the parties’ briefs. Fifty-one percent of the cases 
cited were not mentioned in any of the briefs. To us, that 49% 
figure is notable because it is lower than we expected it would 
be.133
133. To be clear, we did not distinguish among which parts of the opinions (or briefs) 
cited the cases. For example, it may well be that judges or courts have generic procedural 
passages that they frequently cut and paste into opinions to recount well-worn standards of 
review. Thus, the cases cited in the procedural passages may have stickiness rates below 
49% and the cases cited in the “substantive” legal analysis may have stickiness rates above 
49%. This is certainly an additional avenue for exploration, although the Marvell study 
provides some relevant information here. See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text. In 
his study, Dr. Marvell found that only one-sixth of the cases cited in the parties’ briefs 
were mentioned by the court. MARVELL, supra note 24, at 132. He surmised that this low 
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But if you want to know why the stickiness is 49%, we 
cannot tell you that. We can speculate though. Where do the 
other 51% of cited cases come from? Intuition—and our own 
clerkship experiences—point to independent research by the 
courts. Either the judges or members of the judges’ staffs are 
likely doing their own independent research and locating cite-
worthy cases that the parties never mentioned.134
In an ideal world, the parties would present the court with 
the relevant cases and the court would discuss those same 
relevant cases. Thus, the stickiness percentage of the cases cited 
in the briefs would be at or near 100%. Courts would not need to 
engage in independent legal research to locate relevant 
authorities and there would be few or no endogenous case 
citations in the opinions.135
That being said, a stickiness percentage of 100% would not 
necessarily mean that the system was functioning well. A 100% 
not ultimately address. Indeed, he found that the court did not reach one quarter of the legal 
arguments that the parties made in their briefs. Id. However, after omitting these undecided 
legal arguments, Dr. Marvell still found that only one-fifth of the cases cited in the parties’ 
briefs were mentioned by the court. Id. Thus, looking only at the citations relating to the 
substantive issues decided by the court still yielded a rather low percentage of citations 
transmitted from the briefs to the opinion. 
Additionally, our 49% stickiness figure does not account for depth of treatment. Our 
study did not distinguish between cases that were cited only once in the parties’ briefs and 
cases that were cited ten times. Presumably, the stickiness percentage is higher for cases 
that garnered multiple citations in the parties’ briefs. This is another avenue for additional 
research. 
134. Perhaps some small percentage of cases cited in the opinions in our dataset were 
mentioned by the parties somewhere other than the briefs—like at oral argument—and then 
picked up by the court. We didn’t review the oral argument transcripts, so we can’t say for 
sure, but our experience and Dr. Marvell’s previous research indicates that this is a rare 
occurrence. See MARVELL, supra note 24, at 133 (finding that only 10% of the authorities 
cited in the briefs were later mentioned at oral argument and only 1% of the total 
authorities cited in the opinions were mentioned at oral argument but not mentioned in the 
parties’ briefs). Indeed, one reason that we didn’t deem it necessary to review the oral-
argument transcripts is because it is so rare for a case to be mentioned for the first time at 
oral argument. 
Another possibility is that some percentage of the cases cited in the appellate 
opinions in our dataset were cited in the underlying trial-level litigation—including the 
district court’s opinion that was the focus of the appeal—yet were not mentioned in either 
of the parties’ appellate briefs. Again, this seems likely to be rare.
135. Some endogenous case citations may be acceptable, however, because some legal 
rules are identically repeated in numerous cases. Thus, for well-worn legal rules like 
standards of review, it may matter little that the parties are citing one case and the court is 
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stickiness average could be achieved if the parties cited a bunch 
of irrelevant cases and the court was too idle to do any research 
outside of the authorities cited in the briefs. On the other hand, a 
stickiness percentage near zero would necessarily mean that the 
system was working poorly. The parties and the court would 
necessarily be talking past each other, either because the parties 
were citing wholly irrelevant authorities or because the court 
went rogue and decided the matter on some spontaneous ground 
without the benefit of the parties’ input, or both. 
So if we know that something approaching 100% stickiness 
is our aspiration (although not in itself a sufficient indicator of a 
properly functioning appellate process) and we know that 
something approaching 0% stickiness is necessarily a sign of 
major dysfunction in the system, what do we make of 49%? A 
49% stickiness figure tells us that we don’t live in an ideal 
world, but it doesn’t tell us precisely where the breakdowns are 
occurring. Perhaps the critics are correct and either attorneys or 
courts or both are producing less-than-stellar work product. 
Perhaps attorneys’ briefs routinely feature numerous irrelevant 
citations and not enough relevant ones. Maybe courts are 
ignoring relevant cases and lines of argument that were raised by 
the parties.136 It could be that courts are deciding cases based on 
their own reasoning without the benefit of the parties’ input, 
perhaps driven by the desire to rule in a particular party’s favor 
regardless of whether that party has the better legal argument.137
Or it could be that judges—or their law clerks—strive to be 
deliberately unsticky in an attempt to outdo the parties and 
impress the world with garish displays of legal citation.138
136. Or, at the very least, courts may be failing to explain why the cases and lines of 
argument that they treat as irrelevant are in fact irrelevant. 
137. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 74 (2008) (noting that certain 
judges may be “more likely to focus on the ‘equities’ of the individual case—the aspects of 
the case that tug at the heartstrings—and less on its precedential significance”). We would 
think, however, that such judicial behavior—if in fact it occurs—would be more likely to 
be relegated to unpublished opinions. See Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A 
Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 223 (1999) (pointing out that “if, after hearing 
argument, a judge in conference thinks that a certain decision should be reached, but also 
believes that the decision is hard to justify under the law, he or she can achieve the result, 
assuming agreement by the other members of the panel, by deciding the case in an 
unpublished opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the rug”). 
138. Excessive citation is a well-documented plague in legal writing. See, e.g., Alexa Z. 
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Indeed, one trend that we observed was that the judicial 
opinions that cited more cases tended to have lower citation-
stickiness percentages than opinions containing relatively fewer 
case citations.139 Looking at number of cases cited, the top 
quintile of opinions in our dataset cited an average of 47.5 cases. 
The bottom quintile of opinions in our dataset cited an average 
of 7.9 cases. The citation stickiness varied meaningfully 
between these two groups of opinions: the top-quintile opinions 
were 45% sticky, but the bottom-quintile opinions were 60% 
sticky. Perhaps judges who do more independent research feel 
compelled to show their work by citing more cases. 
Another research-based factor driving down citation 
stickiness may be the variety of research tools and methods. 
Perhaps courts and attorneys use different research techniques or 
platforms and are exposed to different spheres of research 
results. If a court relies on Westlaw and the parties rely on 
Lexis, similar searches could simply be returning different 
results.140 Or even more innocuously, perhaps many cases are 
simply interchangeable. If ten or twenty cases all state the same 
proposition, then the parties and the court may cite to different 
cases while discussing the same legal rules or lines of reasoning. 
In that scenario, the court’s independent research turned up the 
same legal principles as the parties’ research, which does not 
suggest dysfunction. 
Through comparison to Dr. Marvell’s study, one thing that 
we do know is that stickiness percentages haven’t changed much 
in recent decades. Our results are extremely similar to the results 
hypercitation as citing more authorities than are needed to support the proposition 
asserted). 
139. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
140. See Susan Nevelow Mart, Results May Vary: Which Database a Researcher Uses 
Makes a Difference, 104 A.B.A. J. 48, 48–49 (Mar. 2018) (“In a comparison of six legal 
databases—Casetext, Fastcase, Google Scholar, Lexis Advance, Ravel and Westlaw—
when researchers entered the identical search in the same jurisdictional database of 
reported cases, there was hardly any overlap in the top 10 cases returned in the results.”); 
Susan Nevelow Mart, The Relevance of Results Generated by Human Indexing and 
Computer Algorithms: A Study of West’s Headnotes and Key Numbers and LexisNexis’s 
Headnotes and Topics, 102 LAW LIBR. J. 221, 241, 240–44 (2010) (comparing the results 
of using West and Lexis features for research and concluding that “each one will find some 
relevant cases on your legal topic” but “it does not look like any one of them can be used to 
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of that study from the 1970s.141 Dr. Marvell found that 48% of 
the authorities cited in the opinions in his dataset had previously 
been cited in the parties’ briefs.142 We found that 49% of the 
cases cited in the opinions in our dataset had previously been 
cited in the parties’ briefs.143 Dr. Marvell found that 17% of the 
authorities cited in the parties’ briefs were later mentioned in the 
opinions.144 We found that 16% of the cases cited in the parties’ 
briefs were later mentioned in the opinions.145
While Dr. Marvell studied a state supreme court in the 
early 1970s,146 we studied the federal courts of appeals in 
2017.147 Yet the similarity of our findings is notable, indicating 
that the evolution of the research process from books to digital 
databases148 has had little effect on citation stickiness. Given the 
consistency between our findings and those of the Marvell 
study, future researchers can use our findings—49% sticky 
citations in opinions and 16% sticky citations in briefs—as 
baselines to which to compare their results.149
141. See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text. 
142. MARVELL, supra note 24, at 134. 
143. See supra Part III. 
144. MARVELL, supra note 24, at 134. 
145. See supra Part III. Sixteen percent was a direct match with what another team of 
researchers found when studying thirty First Circuit cases. See Oldfather, et al., supra note 
48, at 1238.
146. MARVELL, supra note 24, at 6. 
147. See supra Part II. 
148. Over the past quarter century, legal research has shifted from a book-bound 
endeavor to one that is often entirely digital. See, e.g., KENT C. OLSON, PRINCIPLES OF 
LEGAL RESEARCH § 1.2, 5 (2009) (acknowledging that “[m]ost research these days is 
conducted on the Internet”); see also Ellie Margolis & Kristen Murray, Using Information 
Literacy to Prepare Practice-Ready Graduates, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) (“Today’s 
students do not remember a time when research could only be done in books, when the 
only way to access cases was through a digest, when near-instantaneous access to 
information did not exist.” (footnote omitted)); Ellie Margolis & Kristen E. Murray, Say 
Goodbye to the Books: Information Literacy as the New Legal Research Paradigm, 38 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 117, 121–26 (2012) (describing the migration from print to digital 
sources); John Palfrey, Cornerstones of Law Libraries for an Era of Digital-Plus, 102 L.
LIBR. J. 171, 172–77 (2010) (describing trends in legal information use). 
149. For example, future research could uncover whether citations in amicus briefs are 
similarly sticky. That would shed light on whether amicus briefs are worthwhile. Likewise, 
future research could uncover whether particular types of cases—such as nonbinding cases 
in general or unpublished cases in particular—include citations that are similarly sticky. 
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Our results also demonstrate that judicial characteristics 
play little role in citation stickiness. The stickiness percentage 
was similar for judges appointed by Democratic (48%) and 
Republican (52%) presidents.150 Whether the authoring judge 
was a district court judge (51%) or an appellate judge (50%) 
also mattered little, as did whether the authoring judge was 
sitting by designation (49%) or sitting with her home court 
(50%). 
None of our metrics of judicial experience yielded 
significantly different stickiness rates. Active-status judges 
(51%) were similarly sticky to senior-status judges (48%). 
While there were some isolated differences in stickiness when it 
came to age and judging experience, there were almost no 
observable trends. For example, the oldest judges were the least 
sticky (45%), but judges in the two next oldest age brackets 
were the most sticky (52%).151 Setting aside two very small 
sample sizes, there was almost no variation in stickiness based 
on how long it had been since the authoring judge graduated 
from law school.152 Mild variations were exhibited based on the 
number of years since the authoring judge had been 
150. While there wasn’t a meaningful difference between the stickiness percentages of 
opinions authored by appointees of Democratic and Republican presidents, there was some 
variation among judges appointed by individual presidents. The most noteworthy variation 
was the 57% stickiness of opinions authored by judges appointed by President George 
H.W. Bush. This stickiness percentage was notable because it was the product of a not-
insignificant sample size (thirty-seven opinions) and was noticeably higher than other 
recent presidents with not-insignificant sample sizes (all of whom clustered around 
stickiness rates between 49 and 52%). Perhaps judges appointed by President George H.W. 
Bush possess an approach to decisionmaking that is uniform to a unique extent. Another 
researcher has found that judges appointed by President George H.W. Bush are more 
partisan than judges appointed by any other President from Carter to George W. Bush. See
Corey Rayburn Yung, Beyond Ideology: An Empirical Study of Partisanship and 
Independence in the Federal Courts, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 505, 539 (2012). Perhaps 
some relationship exists between partisanship and citation stickiness. 
151. See Figure 20, supra page 103. Setting aside judges older than ninety because 
there were only three results in that category, the other five decades showed almost no 
differences in stickiness. In ascending order, the stickiness rates by decade were 48%, 49%, 
49%, 52%, and 52%. 
152. See Figure 21, supra page 104. In ascending order, the stickiness rates by decade 
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commissioned a federal judge153 or had started judging,154 but 
again without any consistent trend. 
Likewise, the type of case, broadly speaking, had little 
effect on stickiness. Civil cases (48%) and criminal cases (51%) 
were similarly sticky. And, although there were some 
differences in stickiness rates when the cases were sorted by 
Westlaw topic, we simply don’t have a big enough dataset to 
determine whether those differences are meaningful.155
If judge and case characteristics don’t matter much, 
potential avenues for further research could involve isolating 
characteristics of attorneys or their briefs. We observed that only 
16% of the cases cited in the parties’ briefs later appear in the 
resulting opinions. But we wouldn’t expect this number to 
approach 100%, even in an ideal adversarial system. Parties 
sensibly make alternative arguments in their briefs. Appellate 
courts, being economical, decide appeals on as few grounds as 
possible. Thus, an appellant may urge reversal based on three 
alleged errors. But if the appellate court finds one of the errors 
reversible it may not analyze the other two. With this in mind, 
the parties understandably cite more authorities than the courts. 
Yet, 16% struck us as an unexpectedly low stickiness rate for 
cases cited in the parties’ briefs, and the 38% stickiness rate for 
cases that had been cited in both parties’ briefs struck us as 
especially surprising. A case that both parties deemed relevant to 
discuss still had a 62% likelihood of not being mentioned by the 
court. Maybe this is the product of too many string citations in 
the briefs or too many alternative arguments, but maybe it is also 
the product of courts failing to adequately engage with the 
authorities cited by the parties.156
153. See Figure 22, supra page 104. For the four brackets with more than ten results, 
the stickiness rates based on years since commission were—in ascending order—49%, 
48%, 55%, and 49%. 
154. See Figure 23, supra page 104. For the five brackets with more than ten results, the 
stickiness rates based on total judging years were—in ascending order—48%, 49%, 54%, 
47%, and 49%. 
155. When sorted by Westlaw topic, the stickiest topics were Government (53%), Labor 
and Employment (52%), and Sentencing (52%), and the least sticky were Bankruptcy 
(41%) and Patents (42%). But none of those topics had more than twenty cases in our 
dataset. 
156. Indeed, too many string citations could prevent a court from adequately engaging 
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We observed that courts tended to borrow citations more 
heavily from winning parties’ briefs than from losing parties’ 
briefs.157 Thus, the key to getting the court to borrow more of a 
party’s citations may simply be for the party to win the case. Or, 
perhaps, the way for a party to win a case is to have the court 
adopt many of its case citations. Apart from winning and losing, 
some pre-decisional attribute or set of attributes may tend to 
make some attorneys’ briefs stickier than others. Stay tuned for 
further research. 
V. CONCLUSION
The big takeaway from this empirical study is that courts—
not parties—accounted for more than half of the 7552 cases 
cited in the 325 judicial opinions we looked at. This result 
surprised us, as it surprised the small Twitter and conference 
audiences that we polled. Based only on this study, we don’t 
know why so many cases cited in opinions were endogenous. 
But our discovery that more than 50% of the cases cited in 
judicial opinions are endogenous is a novel finding. 
Earlier studies that looked at stickiness used much smaller 
samples of cases decided in only a few courts; our study 
provides results based on a much more robust dataset.158 But 
beyond just filling a gap in the data, we hope that our study of 
citation stickiness provides an empirical foundation for future 
discussions on legal persuasion. In theory, the parties’ research 
should have a great deal of influence on judicial decisions. Yet 
in practice, citation stickiness is both variable and, on average, 
lower than that theory predicts. 
Our study suggests that scholars of legal persuasion and 
judicial decisionmaking should consider citation stickiness 
because it’s an easy-to-calculate proxy for the influence that 
parties’ research has on judicial decisions: divide the total 
number of cases cited in both an opinion and the briefs by the 
number of cases cited in the opinion. This quick calculation 
reveals to what degree the parties’ research “stuck” to the 
citations “drain[] reader energy” and summarizing various legal writing experts’ distaste 
for string citations). 
157. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. 
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judicial decision, which in turn can inform any decision about 
whether additional, more labor-intensive study into the whys 
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All Appeals 325 23479 7552 23.2 3699 1613 
Circuit
1st Circuit 25 1770 626 25.0 354 152 
2d Circuit 25 2312 663 26.5 299 137 
3d Circuit 25 1867 796 31.8 333 128 
4th Circuit 25 2002 436 17.4 240 121 
5th Circuit 25 1587 574 23.0 277 109 
6th Circuit 25 1571 617 24.7 301 110 
7th Circuit 25 1762 397 15.9 196 83 
8th Circuit 25 1613 439 17.6 249 110 
9th Circuit 25 2110 552 22.1 283 136 
10th Circuit 25 1947 777 31.1 352 141 
11th Circuit 25 2054 667 26.7 324 129 
D.C. Circuit 25 1455 520 20.8 265 159 
Fed. Circuit 25 1429 488 19.5 226 98 
Civil or Criminal
Civil 213 15962 4772 22.4 2280 1019 
Criminal 112 7385 2780 24.8 1419 594 
Westlaw Topic
Bankruptcy 14 1099 364 26.0 150 57 
Civil Rights 27 2003 856 31.7 377 150 
Commercial  14 1077 367 26.2 167 83 
Government 20 1359 316 15.8 168 90 
Labor/Employment 32 2281 699 21.8 360 167 
Litigation 19 1591 421 22.2 199 97 
Patents 15 830 247 16.5 103 41 
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All Appeals 49% 51% 21% 16% 
Circuit*
1st Circuit 57% 43% 24% 20% 
2d Circuit 45% 55% 21% 13% 
3d Circuit 42% 58% 16% 18% 
4th Circuit 55% 45% 28% 12% 
5th Circuit 48% 52% 19% 17% 
6th Circuit 49% 51% 18% 19% 
7th Circuit 49% 51% 21% 11% 
8th Circuit 57% 43% 25% 15% 
9th Circuit 51% 49% 25% 13% 
10th Circuit 45% 55% 18% 18% 
11th Circuit 49% 51% 19% 16% 
D.C. Circuit 51% 49% 31% 18% 
Fed. Circuit 46% 54% 20% 16% 
Civil or Criminal
Civil 48% 52% 21% 14% 
Criminal 51% 49% 21% 19% 
Westlaw Topic
Bankruptcy 41% 59% 16% 14% 
Civil Rights 44% 56% 18% 19% 
Commercial Law 46% 54% 23% 16% 
Government 53% 47% 28% 12% 
Labor/Employment 52% 48% 24% 16% 
Litigation 47% 53% 23% 13% 
Patents 42% 58% 17% 12% 
Sentencing 52% 48% 20% 21% 
*The 95% confidence intervals for each circuit: First Circuit = 52.6%–60.5%; Second Circuit =
41.3%–49.0%; Third Circuit = 38.4%–45.3%; Fourth Circuit = 50.2%–59.8%; Fifth Circuit =
44.1%–52.4%; Sixth Circuit = 44.8%–52.8%; Seventh Circuit = 44.3%–54.4%; Eighth Circuit =
51.9%–61.4%; Ninth Circuit = 47.0%–55.5%; Tenth Circuit = 41.8%–48.9%; Eleventh Circuit =
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Affiliation of Appointing President
Democratic  139 10113 3279 23.6 1588 658 
Republican 152 10794 3161 20.8 1633 720
Excluded 34 2440 1112 32.7 478 235 
Appointing President
Obama 82 5893 1804 22.0 884 387 
GW Bush 73 5186 1625 22.3 798 339 
Clinton 48 3404 1253 26.1 612 239 
GHW Bush 37 2728 796 21.5 453 220 
Reagan 39 2625 615 15.8 322 142 
Carter 9 816 222 24.7 92 32 
Ford 2 133 85 42.5 31 7
Nixon 1 122 40 40.0 29 12 
Excluded 34 
Law School
BU 10 623 186 18.6 114 48 
Georgetown 13 794 290 22.3 115 42 
Harvard 43 2739 925 21.5 474 220 
Michigan 14 1155 260 18.6 126 59 
Texas 11 659 209 19.0 100 47 
Tulane 10 747 272 27.2 149 61 
UVA 16 1302 268 16.8 148 61 
Yale 23 1856 694 30.2 341 121 
Sitting by Designation—All
Designated 20 1663 547 27.4 267 98 
Home 271 19244 5893 21.7 2954 1280 
Sitting by Designation—District or Appellate
District  16 1276 402 25.1 206 80 
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Super-Sticky Percent Sticky 
Affiliation of Appointing President
Democratic  48% 52% 20% 16% 
Republican 52% 48% 23% 15%
Appointing President
Obama 49% 51% 21% 15% 
GW Bush 49% 51% 21% 15% 
Clinton 49% 51% 19% 18% 
GHW Bush 57% 43% 28% 17% 
Reagan 52% 48% 23% 12% 
Carter 41% 59% 14% 11% 
Ford 36% 64% 8% 23% 
Nixon 73% 28% 30% 24% 
Law School
BU 61% 39% 26% 18% 
Georgetown 40% 60% 14% 14% 
Harvard 51% 49% 24% 17% 
Michigan 48% 52% 23% 11% 
Texas 48% 52% 22% 15% 
Tulane 55% 45% 22% 20% 
UVA 55% 45% 23% 11% 
Yale 49% 51% 17% 18% 
Sitting by Designation—All
By Designation 49% 51% 18% 16% 
Home 50% 50% 22% 15% 
Sitting by Designation—District or Appellate
District 51% 49% 20% 16% 
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41 to 50 17 1222 322 155 60 18.9 
51 to 60 63 4756 1352 660 278 21.5 
61 to 70 97 6475 2269 1111 474 23.4 
71 to 80 78 5812 1634 852 437 20.9 
81 to 90 33 2394 797 413 177 24.2 
91 to 100 3 248 66 30 11 22.0 
Years since Law Degree
11 to 20 4 384 91 39 20 22.8 
21 to 30 55 3819 1116 564 238 20.3 
31 to 40 60 4392 1334 668 312 22.2 
41 to 50 109 7417 2464 1217 475 22.6 
51 to 60 54 4015 1140 578 264 21.1 
61 to 70 9 783 284 157 71 31.6 
Years from Commission
1 to 10 91 6706 2035 1003 440 22.4 
11 to 20 83 5863 2050 976 395 24.7 
21 to 30 71 5080 1476 815 367 20.8 
31 to 40 43 3003 754 367 157 17.5 
41 to 50 3 255 125 60 19 41.7 
Total Judging Years
1 to 10 46 3245 953 457 204 20.7 
11 to 20 71 5728 1773 863 354 25.0 
21 to 30 91 6147 1980 1077 490 21.8 
31 to 40 58 4002 1212 571 219 20.9 
41 to 50 23 1608 470 230 104 20.4 
51 to 60 2 177 52 23 7 26.0 
Active or Senior
Active 224 16111 4684 2384 1040 20.9 
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41 to 50 48% 52% 19% 13% 
51 to 60 49% 51% 21% 14% 
61 to 70 49% 51% 21% 17% 
71 to 80 52% 48% 27% 15% 
81 to 90 52% 48% 22% 17% 
91 to 100 45% 55% 17% 12% 
Years since Law Degree
11 to 20 43% 57% 22% 10% 
21 to 30 51% 49% 21% 15% 
31 to 40 50% 50% 23% 15% 
41 to 50 49% 51% 19% 16% 
51 to 60 51% 49% 23% 14% 
61 to 70 55% 45% 25% 20% 
Years from Commission
1 to 10 49% 51% 22% 15% 
11 to 20 48% 52% 19% 17% 
21 to 30 55% 45% 25% 16% 
31 to 40 49% 51% 21% 12% 
41 to 50 48% 52% 15% 24% 
Total Judging Years
1 to 10 48% 52% 21% 14% 
11 to 20 49% 51% 20% 15% 
21 to 30 54% 46% 25% 18% 
31 to 40 47% 53% 18% 14% 
41 to 50 49% 51% 22% 14% 
51 to 60 44% 56% 13% 13% 
Active or Senior
Active 51% 49% 22% 15% 
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Cited per Brief 
Opening Briefs (325) 11168 2156 19% 34.4 
Response Briefs (325) 13166 2759 21% 40.5 
Reply Briefs (295) 5827 1245 21% 19.8 
Opening and Reply Briefs  14659 2563 17% _____
Cited in Both Parties’ Briefs 4276 1613 38% _____
From Response Brief to Reply Brief  1105 283 26% ___ 
From One Party’s Brief to Opinion 23536 3699 16% _____
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Appellant Won (86) 5807 1805 861 421 21.0 
Appellee Won (201) 14021 4431 2287 977 22.0 
Citations in Opinions Citations in Briefs
Percent Sticky Percent Super Sticky Percent Sticky 
Appellant Won 48% 23% 15% 




(Out of 6236 Cases 
Cited in All Opinions) 
Percent Sticky 
Cites in Opinions 
Percent Sticky 
Cites in Briefs 
Winning Party (297) 11937 2530 41% 21% 
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